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ABSTRACT 
For 61 years, Israel has confronted intractable external hostility that has tested the 
mettle of its democratic foundation and institutions. Its effects are particularly 
pronounced with respect to the relationship between the country’s civil and military 
spheres. Unlike other contemporary Western democracies, Israel has embraced an 
arrangement whereby the normally distinct boundaries separating government, military 
and society have been allowed to become blurred. While the Israel Defense Force (IDF) 
remains officially subordinate to elected leadership, and the likelihood of its intervention 
in Israeli politics remains exceedingly remote, its pervasive influence on policy formation 
and implementation is distinctive and troubling to some. As the direct threat to Israel’s 
existence has receded, the IDF has begun to shed its identity as the embodiment of the 
nation-in-arms in favor of a new emphasis on military professionalization. It remains to 
be seen what impact this will have on Israeli society, its sense of security, and its view of 
military institutions. It is safe to assume, however, the changing social attitudes will 
continue to shape the state’s often obscure civil-military dynamic, which will, in turn, 
help to define the prospects for cooperation, stability and regional peace. 
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Sixty-one years after Israel’s founding, the nature of its civil-military relations 
continue to reflect and define the state’s character, affecting the formulation and 
implementation of strategy and security policy. Based on a uniquely balanced, 3-legged 
model comprised of: 1) a freely elected civilian government, 2) broadly empowered 
security apparatus, and 3) semi-militarized populace,1 Israel constitutes one of only two 
democracies in the Middle East.2 While the military sphere remains formally subordinate 
to elected leadership, a blurring of boundaries and development of de facto partnership 
with the elected government is unique among contemporary democracies.3 Despite 
Israel’s unwieldy relationship between, 1) its core societal elements and 2) senior civil-
military elites, the decision-making system continues to function effectively in response 
to short-term/operational matters, exhibiting no signs of either imminent deterioration or 
military intervention. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary motivation of this thesis is to explore the evolution of the civil-
military relations in Israel, with particular interest focused on, 1) the post-1967 War 
timeframe and 2) the key domestic actors who comprise the system. As the level of 
conventional threat to Israel has receded, the interrelationship of Israel’s three spheres 
(government, military and populace) has evolved in response to emerging asymmetric 
dangers. It is unclear how (or if) this unique dynamic can keep pace with changes to both 
Israeli society and the nature of threats confronting it. At a minimum, it is worth 
                                                 
1 Yoram Peri, “The Political-military Complex: The IDF's Influence over Policy towards the 
Palestinians since 1987,” Israel Affairs 11, no. 2 (2005): 328.  
2 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-military Relations in the Middle East,” 
Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 70. Kamrava refers to Israel and Turkey as “military 
democracies,” featuring “regular meaningful elections, vibrant party systems and genuine input by the 
electorate into the political process.” 
3 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, “Civil-military Relations and Democracy: The Case of Military-political Elites' 
Connection in Israel,” Armed Forces and Society 22 (1996): 401. Israel…had developed Civil-military 
relations that differ from those of other democracies in that Israel lacks the separation between the 
government/political elite and the military elite.” 
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considering whether the system’s post-1967 evolution is consistent with the continued 
stability of Israeli democracy, and what effect it has on future policy formulation and 
implementation 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Israeli civil-military relations exhibit the paradoxical characteristics of a 
democratic society, which has willingly accepted military primacy over significant 
elements of state policy and direction. Subjected to intractable conflict and faced with the 
pervasive threat of violence, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) emerged as the guarantor of 
Israel’s survival, establishing its mystique, prestige and positive reputation domestically.4 
Coupled with a hopelessly fractious parliamentary system,5 and a populace instilled with 
a high notion of civic duty and patriotism, Israeli society has developed a dependency on 
physical security and government-military cooperation as the bedrock of survival. While 
policy fluctuates according to the political parties and key personalities in power, the 
ambiguous relationship between the Prime Minister (PM), Defense Minister (DEFMIN) 
and IDF Chief of the General Staff (CGS) remains the key obstacle in charting clear, 
effective policy boundaries.6  
Whereas the state’s founders labored to establish a hierarchy under which the 
military sphere remained subservient to elected civilian leadership, there has been 
perennial concern that the nature of this relationship has altered over time (notably, in the 
                                                 
4 Metin Heper and Joshua Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 33, no. 2 (2005): 231. “For Israelis, armed conflict became the 
ultimate method of resolving the issue of their state’s disputed existence.” 
5 Charles D. Freilich, “National Security Decision-making in Israel: Processes, pathologies, and 
strengths,” The Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): 639–640. According to Freilich, “The single most 
important structural determinant of Israel’s national security decision-making process is the PR electoral 
system and the consequent need to govern through coalition-cabinets.” Given low threshold requirements 
for party participation, smaller movements wield disproportionate influence, resulting in a governmental 
focus on coalition management, vice policy formulation. As such, the IDF has interjected itself into the 
vacuum to drive security considerations. 
6 Peri, “The Political-Military Complex, 335”; Amir Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 
1996–2003,” Israel Affairs 12, no. 3 (2006): 365–366. The informal relationship between PM, DEFMIN 
and CGS has never been adequately or legally defined. While the arrangement may have the outward 
façade of stability, particularly with regard to Israel’s civil-military partnership, cracks in the veneer have 
become increasingly common over the past 15–20 years. This has resulted in numerous political squabbles 
between the various personalities involved. 
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years since the 1967 War). Rather than formalizing roles and assigning responsibility 
through a legal framework, the subsequent practice of hierarchy via custom and tradition 
contributed to blurred inter-domain boundaries. This resulted in a cooperative, if 
nebulous, process whereby the defense establishment fills a recognized policy vacuum by 
functioning as de facto formulator/driver. Owing to, 1) its unrivaled expertise on security 
matters and 2) the historical prestige and high regard afforded the IDF domestically; this 
default arrangement has been readily accepted by society as the most effective means of 
assuring national security.  
Due to the reduction in conventional threat since the 1978 Camp David Accords, 
coupled with Israeli society’s gradual Westernization (i.e., in terms of military tactics and 
technology, economic privatization and globalization, culture, etc.), the question of where 
the state’s civil-military relations are heading looms large. Will the security establishment 
continue to exercise de facto hegemony over security and strategic policy issues, or will 
elected government re-assert its authority over the process by establishing a relevant 
civilian policy infrastructure? Will the move toward a more “professional” military 
divorce the IDF from its roots as a mass-based, popular institution, and what effect could 
this have on its relationship to both government and society?  
How this situation plays out is not only domestically relevant within Israel, but 
has larger implications for the possibility of future resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (and by extension, U.S. policy in the region). To interact effectively with the 
Jewish State, Western leaders need to understand the nuances, intricacies and priority 
drivers of Israel’s civil-military dynamic, as there exists a distinct departure from the 
traditional separation of the two domains (where subordination and professionalism are 
the accepted norms). Only in this manner can greater cohesion in regional policy 
coordination (and hopefully peace) be attained. This study is designed to provide an 
overview of the manner in which the development of civil-military relations can be 
defined based on the confluence of historical, cultural and economic factors. 
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C. FINDINGS 
While the nature of the Israeli civil-military model is certainly, 1) unique and 2) a 
deviation from traditionally accepted Western notions regarding involvement of the 
armed forces in political processes and policy formulation, in this case it appears to be 
reasonably effective under the given set of circumstances. By examining Israel through 
an extensive historical case study and tracking the maturation of domestic components, it 
becomes apparent that the system’s weakness has been mitigated through, 1) semi-
effective inter-sphere coordination and 2) the mobilization of quantitatively inferior 
manpower and arms in defense of the state. This was highlighted during 1967’s lightning 
campaign, where IDF policy control (focused on the operational level) lead to gains well 
beyond initial government goals. The luster was short lived, however, a function of 
subsequent diminished military performance (1973, 1982, and operations in the Occupied 
Territories) and the shift of society toward a mindset placing greater emphasis on 
individualism, in lieu of collectivism, nationalism and patriotism. The latter has had a 
significant impact on checking the potential for runaway military influence, as pluralism 
and free elections tend to assure a referendum on policies swaying too far from the center 
toward either extreme. 
The nature of the IDF’s development has also played an important role in its 
relationship with the elected government. Israel’s founder/first Prime Minister, David 
Ben-Gurion, sought to assure a strong, stable civilian control of the military by 
combining the portfolios of PM and DEFMIN in his own hands. His strength of character 
assured civil dominance during the formative years,7 but by the mid 1960s, the two roles 
were split, leaving the latter with little true authority over operational forces or decision 
making.8 This facilitated a creeping encroachment by the IDF into the political domain, 
whereby partisan differences regarding the peace process increasingly tainted military 
                                                 
7 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 375; Ze'ev Schiff, “Fifty Years of Israeli 
Security: The Central Role of the Defense System,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 3, Special Issue on Israel 
(1999): 435–436. Ben-Gurion firmly believed “the Army determines neither the policies, administration, 
nor the laws of the state…The army is nothing more than the executive arm for the defense and security of 
the State of Israel…The army is unconditionally subordinate to the government.” 
8 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 375. According to Bar-Or, the only true 
“civil supremacy” over the IDF existed under Ben-Gurion’s administration.  
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policy and strategy through the 1990s (and to the present).9 Over time, it became clear 
that excluding the military from politics and policymaking was simply unworkable, as the 
organization functioned as the public domain’s sole repository of staff and strategy 
experience.10 
By the late 1980s, the IDF itself became the primary driver behind the peace 
process, convinced it was the only means of assuring long-term security. This reflected 
the changing dynamic of both global and regional conditions: 1) the Cold War’s end, 2) 
longer-ranged weapons in the hands of distant enemies, and 3) the difficulty in 
suppressing the First Intifada (1987–1989).11 There was a pragmatic realization that 
military solutions alone were no longer effective in assuring safety, and according to 
Yitzchak Rabin, “Israel cannot enforce peace accords it favours (contingent on) the 
defeat or conquest of Arab States. This is an unpleasant state of affairs, but it is how 
things stand.”12 As such, the IDF became increasingly involved in external policy 
negotiation and implementation (via planning and intelligence functions). It also began 
gradually shifting force structure away from a conscription-based, popular organization 
to a smaller, more professional model. By the late 1990s, however, renewed violence 
associated with the Second Intifada (2000–2004/5) lead to a further reversal in the IDF’s 
position. Military leadership adopted a kinetic force approach to combating the 
insurrection, and was concerned by what they saw as government inconsistency on the 
                                                 
9 Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 231. According to 
Heper and Itzkowitz-Shfrrinson, “The nature of Israeli politics was…irrevocably intertwined with defense 
matters as well as foreign policy issues.” 
10 Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 330; Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: 
Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,” 641–642. Freilich states, “policy planning and formulation 
capabilities in the civilian national security bureaucracies remain weak….Only the IDF has a highly 
effective policy formulating mechanism.” 
11 Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 325. “In order to enhance preparedness for a possible 
confrontation with ‘second circle’ states, Israel would need to reach a political accommodation with its 
‘first circle’ neighbours even at the cost of territorial assets.” 
12 Ibid., 327, 338. According to Peri, “The IDF came to realize that it would be worthwhile ceding 
territory in order to change the status quo and attain a political agreement with Syria, Jordan and the 
Palestinians.” This positional shift was a function of realism (vice altruism), and is evident in viewing 
peace “not as a primary goal in itself, but first and foremost as a means of attaining security.” 
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issue (negotiating and contemplating withdrawals during “combat”).13 This has 
contributed to the inability of successive Israeli governments to develop and/or 
implement effective policies relating to peace negotiations.  
While some will question the close ties and fragmented boundaries between the 
government and security spheres as anathematic to proper civil-military relations, there 
has never been an overt challenge to civilian supremacy. The likelihood of military 
intervention into the political domain is exceedingly small. The IDF appears to remain 
focused on the professionalization of its force structure in the face of consistently 
shrinking budgets, but it remains unclear how this shift from the nation-in-arms model 
will eventually affect the armed forces relationship with both government and society.  
This study’s goal is to analyze the development of Israeli civil-military relations 
to understand how a society adapts its domestic characteristics and methodologies to 
meet the threat of ongoing hostility and violence, while remaining democratic in nature. 
While it does not attempt to project future developments, there are certainly trends that 
can be extrapolated. First, Israel remains a pluralistic democracy challenged by ongoing 
conflict. Second. Israel’s development was explicitly influenced by its security dilemma. 
Third, Israel continues to rely on a uniquely hybrid arrangement whereby civil and 
military spheres function as a de facto partnership. Finally, continued Westernization and 
Globalization will directly impact the character of its security establishment (to include 
its larger role within society). 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The nature of power sharing and influence within the Israel, especially between 
the armed forces and government, underwent significant change in the years following 
the 1967 War. This process, highlighted by the diminished military performances in 
1973, 1982, and both Intifadas, was accelerated during the historic 1977 election defeat 
of the MAPAI/LABOR coalition. As a result of: 1) the end of MAPAI/LABOR 
                                                 
13 Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 334. “Just as at the beginning of the 1990s the military had 
shown a willingness to make far-reaching concessions in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, 
at the end of the 1990s it pressed for severe measures to counter the second intifada.” 
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hegemony, 2) a divergence in perspective on national security, and 3) the growth of Israel 
into a sophisticated economic engine, the IDF has come to play an ever more pervasive 
role in policy formation. This is a direct contradiction to the aspirations of Israel’s 
founding fathers. That said, despite fluctuations in policy focus and direction within both 
civil and military domains (the result of ebbs and flows of parties and personalities), the 
system’s basic structure has remained inherently intact. Israel remains a stable 
democracy, with formal military subordination to civilian leadership precluding any 
potential for overt intervention by the IDF into the political domain. While the 
cooperative nature between the two spheres blurs traditional democratic boundaries, and 
the armed forces exert significant influence in policy determination, the model appears to 
function adequately in addressing the Jewish state’s short-term security requirements.  
E. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II discusses overarching theoretical concepts and models relevant to the 
study of civil-military relations. Particular emphasis is placed on the notions of: 1) 
boundaries and the separation of government and security domains, 2) the effect of 
professionalization on the armed forces, 3) societal militarism and the “nation-in-arms” 
construct, and 4) subjective versus objective means of control. The academic community 
itself has adopted a variety of (often-conflicting) positions relating to the notion of what 
constitutes effective and desired civil-military relations. While Huntington’s premise on 
the desirability of military separation from/subordination to civilian authorities has long 
stood as the gold standard, it has come under increasing scrutiny over recent years, 
particularly concerning Israel itself. 
Chapter III examines the three domestic societal enablers, which play key roles in 
Israeli civil-military relations: 1) the fragmented nature of Israel’s political system, 2) the 
militarization of society via universal conscription, and 3) an autonomous and powerful 
military-industrial complex, a result of Israel’s economic development. The former 
results from a PR system which sets the threshold for Knesset participation too low, 
thereby resulting in an unwieldy coalition system highlighted by a large number of 
political parties. The middle results from a 3-tiered military model where a large reserve 
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component is utilized to complement the small professional and conscript force in the 
event of crisis. In this manner, reservists’ unique connection to society allows for the 
two-way transmission of both military and civilian values between the spheres. The latter 
is a function of Israel’s determination to avoid over-reliance on foreign sources for arms. 
While such autonomy was at the crux of early policy, growing U.S. economic and 
military support has altered the nature of the Israeli military-industrial complex. This was 
coupled with a determined effort to move away from a statist economic system, with an 
increased emphasis on privatization and reduced public sector spending since the mid-
1980s. 
Chapter IV discusses the early foundation of civil-military relations in Israel, from 
the period of state formation (1948) until 1967’s Six Day War. It focuses on the desire of 
the Jewish State’s founding fathers to establish and maintain civilian control over the 
military. While such control was initially enacted, the eventual retirement of Israel’s first 
Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, coupled with a less resolute successor (in the person 
of Levi Eshkol) allowed for the separation of PM and DEFMIN portfolios (which Ben-
Gurion had held himself) and the interjection of the IDF into policy-related decision 
making. Wildly successful operations during the 1967 conflict only served to cement the 
prestige of the armed forces, which could do no wrong in the eyes of the Israeli public. 
Chapter V examines the aftermath of the 1967 war, with particular emphasis 
placed on, 1) declining public perception of the IDF and 2) growing activism exhibited 
by certain senior IDF leaders. While attempts were made to define the roles and 
boundaries of the military domain more effectively, most fell short because of political 
interference and/or lack of will. Instead, CGS’s became more prominent in their ability to 
both speak out publicly and drive policy/budget considerations. Additionally, the twin 
phenomenon of, 1) political courting of military officers and 2) “parachuting” from 
military to political careers became increasingly common (particularly after 
HERUT/LIKUD’s momentous election victory in 1977). 
Chapter VI follows the progression of civil-military relations from the Cold War’s 
aftermath through the Oslo Peace process and into the present. Primary focus is levied on 
the IDF’s role as supporter of peace during the early 1990s (as a means of attaining 
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security), followed by a drastic shift toward direct application of force to crush popular 
Palestinian uprisings by 2000 (a direct result of the 2nd Intifada). While a disproportionate 
number of PMs during this timeframe were former military, and the jump from retirement 
to political leadership became increasingly routine, there remained a deep divide in 
policy making between government and the IDF (highlighted by increased friction during 
the first Netanyahu administration). Fluctuation in the nature of personalities at the 
highest levels, coupled with difficulty in formulating effective strategic policy, continue 
to reinforce the strength of both boundary fragmentation and military involvement in the 
process. 
 10
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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY 
The relationship between civil and military domains is a crucial factor in the 
governance of democratic societies. According to Peter Feaver, the inherent paradox in 
civil-military relations is “the need to have protection by the military and the need to have 
protection from the military.”14 While the traditional Western model elaborated by 
Samuel Huntington in 1957 promotes the rigid separation of the spheres as a means of 
assuring proper balance and military subordination, Israel’s distinctive arrangement came 
into being (and subsequently developed) based on the immediacy and necessity of 
survival. It simultaneously combined both security and policymaking in the face of 
intractable threat, morphing into a unique societal arrangement whereby the borders 
between the two have become blurred. While academic viewpoints over the years have 
fluctuated regarding the concepts of domain boundaries, military professionalism and the 
effects of militarism on society, the Israeli experience remains paradoxical. It does not 
neatly fit neatly into the paradigms of either Western or emerging societies, owing to 
inherently close ties between civil society, the military apparatus and the political elite. In 
spite of it all, for 61 years, the Jewish state has managed to function as a democratic 
system.  
A. DEFINITIONS 
The following are a list of basic terms, which are necessary for understanding the 
foundation of civil-military relations. 
• The military: According to Samuel Finer, modern militaries are cohesive 
and hierarchical.15 Armed forces are purposive instruments who tend to be 
far more rigidly organized than any other state-level entity.16 They are 
                                                 
14 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 154. 
15 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 6–13. 
16 Ibid., 12. According to Finer, the military is defined by: 1) centralized command, 2) hierarchy, 3) 
discipline, 4) intercommunications, and 5) esprit de corps. They are also a “continuing corporation with an 
intense sentiment of solidarity….This formidable corporate body is more lethally and heavily armed than 
any other organization in the state.” 
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seldom the recipient of universal love or respect from civil populations, 
and their ability to focus on anything beyond operational environments or 
primitive governing (resulting from intervention or occupation) is limited. 
Additionally, while most (or perhaps all) security organizations view 
themselves as the protectors of national interests, they lack the legitimacy 
to rule unilaterally, and may conceive or prioritize those interests 
differently from the rest of society.17  
• Professionalism: A sociological and analytical construct that can be 
applied to the officer corps. In the case of civil-military relations, it is 
defined by three primary dimensions: 1) educational expertise, 2) a sense 
of service and responsibility to society based on higher principles, and 3) a 
sense of corporate identity that sets the organization apart from 
outsiders/the remainder of society.18 Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz articulated two influential theories relating to professionalism. 
The former, prominent during the early Cold War years, viewed the 
officer corps through the prism of potential total conflict. The goal was to 
assure the security sphere remained benign in the civil-military 
relationship by removing the possibility of it being drawn into politics. As 
such, the proscribed course of action was to separate the military from 
society to both maximize its martial capabilities and assure it remained 
subservient to the state.19 Janowitz, in contrast, argued that as the threat of 
mutual annihilation decreased, the military began to shed its corporate 
distinctiveness and re-connect with society. This process gradually eroded 
the inter-domain gap, so that professionalism and discipline have given 
way to increasing pragmatism and a management process.20 While he 
concurs there remains a need for military subservience to civilian 
leadership, closer ties between the armed forces and society are generally 
a good thing from his perspective, since the subordination of armed forces 
to civil authority is strengthened if the trends and attitudes prominent in 
society are reflected in the military. 
                                                 
17 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 14, 17–21, 35–37.  
18 Bernard Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, State and Society in 
Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 52–53. It is Boene’s contention that this development 
“made it possible to think in terms of military autonomy and Civil-military coordination, while preserving 
the principle of military subordination to the civil power.” 
19 Ibid., 53–56. The assessed fault of this school of thought was that, 1) distinct separation may 
remove the military’s knowledge of/regard for political considerations associated with conflict, and 2) there 
is the possibility (however slim) that militaristic/nationalistic trends within society could be transmitted to 
the armed forces. 
20 Ibid., 56–60. Societal changes played a role in this development, as: 1) the mandate of service to 
country diminished, 2) instant communications whittled away at the separation between the spheres, and 3) 
“the distinction between peacetime and wartime becomes blurred.”  
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• Militarism: According to Mira Sucharov, militarism at the policy level is 
the perception that “organized violence, or war, is the optimal solution for 
political problems.” In taking the definition to the normative/societal level, 
Sucharov postulates that militarism is “the subordination of civil society to 
military values and the subordination of civilian control of the military for 
military control of the civilian.”21  
• Boundaries/Separation/Permeability: According to Moshe Lissak, “the 
boundaries between military and civilian systems were never hermetically 
sealed. There was mutual influence.”22 Samuel Huntington elaborated 
further, stating 
the distribution of power between civilian and military groups…varies 
with the compatibility between ideology prevailing in society and the 
professional military ethic….The realization of objective civilian control 
thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between 
the power of the military and the ideology of society.”23  
This resulted in theoretical classification of three specific boundary types: 1) 
integral, 2) permeated, and 3) fragmented. Integral applies to ideal democratic states, 
where “the interchange between persons holding roles at various levels of the military 
hierarchy and the environment are under control of those with responsible for setting the 
operational goals of the armed forces, that is the higher command.” Permeated implies a 
totalitarian regime, where “complete fusion both in respect of goals and of organization 
between the possessors of the means of violence and other social groups.” Finally, under 






                                                 
21 Mira Sucharov, “Security Ethics and the Modern Military: The Case of the Israel Defense Forces,” 
Armed Forces & Society 3, no. 2 (2005): 190.  
22 Moshe Lissak, “A Militaristic Society or a Democracy in Uniform,” in Security Concerns: Insights 
from the Israeli Experience, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson, and Aharon Klieman (Stamford: JAI Press, 
1998), 419. 
23 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957), 94.  
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civilian roles escape the control of the military elite in a way that impairs its freedom to 
interact with the political and social environment as a single entity in a consistent 
manner.”24 
• Linkages: Individual and institutional level meeting points between the 
civil and military spheres through which unique patterns of interaction 
occur.25 These exist at all levels of permeability, but are more readily 
apparent in cases of permeated and fragmented connections, where 
additional meeting points equate to increased fragmentation. In the Israeli 
case, the linkages include: 1) social networks, 2) political networks, 3) 
economic networks, 4) educational networks, and 5) military service (via 
the reserve system). 
• Nation-in-arms: Portrayed as a model where the boundaries between the 
civil and military domains are fragmented. First observed in France’s 
levee en masse of 1793, this comprehensive system is predicated upon the 
conscription of the state’s entire (male) population, later extending to 
include contributions made by civilians on the home front.26 According to 
Uri Ben-Eliezer, “the nation-in-arms model ascribes an important place to 
the state in creating—or exploiting—nationalist sentiment.”27 It merges 
society and the armed forces under one objective, thereby mitigating 
perception of the military as distant/alien and hopefully reducing the 
potential for intervention against the government.  
                                                 
24 A. R. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-military Relations,” Government and 
Opposition 6, no. 1 (1971): 16–18; Stuart A. Cohen, “Changing Civil-military Relations in Israel; Towards 
an Over-subordinate IDF?” Israel Affairs 12, no. 4 (2006): 772; Moshe Lissak, “The Unique Approach to 
Military-societal Relations in Israel and Its Impact on Foreign and Security Policy,” in Peacemaking in a 
Divided Society: Israel after Rabin, ed. Sasson Sofer (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 238–239. 
Lissak, “A Militaristic Society or a Democracy in Uniform,” 417. Based on role expansion of the IDF 
beyond purely military functions, as well as cooperation between civil and security domains, Israel most 
accurately falls into the latter category (i.e., that of fragmented boundaries).  
25 Lissak, “The Unique Approach to Military-societal Relations in Israel,” 239; Lissak, “A Militaristic 
Society or a Democracy in Uniform,” 417. According to Lissak, this pertains to a “variety of formal 
linkages or points of encounter between the military system and civilian frameworks,” and that “in every 
society there are certain meeting points, at different levels.”  
26 Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 2 (1995): 267; Omer Bartov, “'The Nation in Arms': 
Germany and France, 1789–1939,” History Today 44, no. 9 (1994): 27–33. Bartov presents an extensive 
historical overview of nation-in-arms formation and development in both France and Prussia/Imperial 
Germany. While these may differ in size, practice and rationale from the Israeli model, they laid the 
groundwork for the practice of mass conscription and holistic effort later incorporated by the Jewish state. 
27 Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years,” 268–269. 
Ben-Eliezer paints an unflattering picture in his description of nation-in-arms. While he acknowledges that 
the model does not “excel” in military coups, he tends to harp on the potential for militarism, whereby the 
natural impetus is to select force as a means of confronting political issues. 
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B. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The underlying requirement in explaining the evolution of Israeli civil-military 
relations is establishing a coherent conceptual definition/framework, which can be 
effectively applied across the spectrum of socio-political models. First and foremost, the 
very nature of relations between legitimate governments and their armed forces need be 
articulated. In Huntington’s seminal work, Soldier and the State, it is postulated that 
civil-military relations are shaped by three underlying variables: 1) the level of external 
threat (his functional imperative), 2) the constitutional structure of the state (one of his 
societal imperatives), and 3) the ideological composition/perceptions of society (the other 
societal imperative).28 The author opines that “civil-military relations is the principle 
institutional component of military security policy” and that “the principle focus of civil-
military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state. Here the conflict between 
functional and societal pressures comes to a head.”29 This inspired the dual premises that, 
1) civil and military domains should always remain distinctly separate and 2) 
professionalization of the military can inherently instill an organizational subordination to 
civilian leadership.30 Huntington proceeds to describe the five ideal/distinct patterns of 
relationship, based on the following independent variables: 1) level of military 
acceptance in society (pro/anti), 2) amount of military political power (low/high), and 3) 
                                                 
28 Peter D. Feaver, An Agency Theory Explanation of American Civil-military Relations during the 
Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1997), 1–87, http://www.poli.duke.edu/dipe/Feaver1.pdf, 1 
(accessed October 23, 2009). 
29 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 1, 3.  
30 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 24. In this manner, encouraging 
professionalism will allow the military to focus on martial pursuits and its own autonomy, leaving politics 
to the politicians. This is the basis for the preponderance of modern civil-military theories, and has long 
been deemed the optimal arrangement in Western societies. 
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level of military professionalism (low/high).31 These are basic guidelines for assessing 
the interrelationship between the two spheres but, while applicable to most states, do not 
account for all possible examples (notably, Israel).  
Samuel Finer, in his work The Man on Horseback, adopts an opposing stance 
regarding Huntington’s emphasis on the merits of military professionalism. As armed 
forces are highly organized, hierarchical, goal oriented and well armed, they inherently 
pose a threat to civilian leadership if not adequately subordinated.32 Rather than assuring 
formal, long-term civilian control, it is his contention that professionalism can actually 
isolate the armed forces from society and exacerbate its corporate consciousness, creating 
the potential for backlash against civil leadership.33 Finer, therefore, believes that “firm 
acceptance of civilian supremacy, not just professionalism, is the truly effective check 
against military intervention.”34  
The issue of civil control itself has traditionally lacked adequate definition, 
tending to be rooted in law, custom and tradition. Kobi Michael defines it as “a process 
whose efficiency is best measured by evaluating the relative influence of military officers 
                                                 
31 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 96–97. 
These permutations include: 1) anti-military, high military power and low military professionalism (found 
in developing nations), 2) anti-military, low military power and low military professionalism (World War II 
Germany), 3) anti-military, high military political power and high military professionalism (the United 
States from the Civil War through World War II), 4) pro military, high military political power and high 
military professionalism (Prussia during late 19th century), and 5) pro-military, low military political power 
and high military professionalism (the United Kingdom during the 20th century). While Israel does not 
neatly fall under any one of these constructs due to its unique circumstances, the fourth example appears 
the closest due to the high level of security threat and exaggerated influence of the Israel Defense Force 
(IDF).  
32 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 6–13. According to Finer, “the 
armed forces …are not only the most highly organized association in the state. They are a continuing 
corporation with an intense sentiment of solidarity, enjoying…considerable favor. This formidable 
corporate body is more lethally and heavily armed than any other organization in the state, and indeed 
enjoys a near-monopoly of all effective weapons.” 
33 Ibid., 25–26; Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 15. Finer states “the very nature of the professionalism on which Huntington sets such 
store…in fact often thrusts the military into collision with the civilian authorities.” He further demonstrates 
the weakness of Huntington’s position by listing several examples of highly professionalized militaries that 
intervened in politics. This includes not only Germany and Imperial Japan, but contains a reference to the 
United State’s MacArthur/Truman standoff.  
34 Ibid., 25, 30. 
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and civilians over state decisions.”35 Huntington, Finer, Janowitz, and Cohen are all 
supporters of the need for strong civilian control, as well as separation between the two 
spheres. “To maintain democracy, it is necessary for the military to be under the control 
of the civilian authority,” and there remains a “tendency to regard the relative autonomy 
and political neutrality of the military elite as necessary to democracy.”36 Conversely, 
Peri, Lissak, Horowitz, Ben-Eliezer and Schiff believe that closeness between the civil 
and military domains actually fosters a positive environment. “Closeness preserves 
democracy: it is instrumental in preventing conflict between them, and hence decreases 
the chances for military coups.”37  
Theoretically, civilian control can be broken down into two distinct 
methodologies, consisting of subjective or objective mechanisms. According to 
Huntington, “subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, 
making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by 
militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state” (see Figure 138). Historically, 
the military has sought an increase of objective control, while civilian governments have 
been more inclined to seek/maintain subjective control. 
   
                                                 
35 Kobi Michael, “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity 
Conflict—The Israeli Case,” Israel Studies 12, no. 1 (2007): 38. 
36 Etzioni-Halevy, “Civil-military Relations and Democracy: The Case of Military-political Elites' 
Connection in Israel,” 402. The corollary to this approach is that military involvement in the public process 
indicates both a weakness of civil control and a failure of political institutions. 
37 Ibid., 402–403.  
38 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 83; 
Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, State and Society in Israel: 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 46.  
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Figure 1.   Controls over the Military 
Huntington’s position stipulated that subjective control (i.e., the maximizing of 
civilian power relative to the armed forces) was the dominant format utilized by Western 
society until recently.39 It seeks to improve the influence of one particular 
group/segment/faction at the expense of others via the cooption and incorporation of 
military influence. A given regime, therefore, seeks to limit access to the legitimate 
means of organized violence to those it trusts, by controlling access to positions of senior 
military leadership via the appointment/dismissal process.40 Concurrently, the use of  
 
 
                                                 
39 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 80–83. 
In this statement, “recent” implied the late 1950s (i.e., time of publishing). Under this broad heading, 
Huntington spells out the various forms of subjective control, to include: 1) government institutions, 2) 
social class, and 3) constitutional form. 
40 Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, State and Society in Israel: 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 47–48. 
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short--term conscription reduces the risk of a state-within-a-state by, 1) eliminating the 
possibility of a clique developing a long--term sense of individuality and 2) increasing 
the armed forces’ loyalty to the state itself.  
Objective control, conversely, is a function of maximizing military 
professionalism and autonomy for use as a state tool. According to Huntington, 
“objective civilian control not only reduces the power of the military to the lowest 
possible level vis-à-vis all civilian groups, it also maximizes the likelihood of achieving 
military security.”41 Cohen concurs with the need for strong control over the armed 
forces, stating, “‘objective’ control over the military requires not just a mature democracy 
but also a professionally autonomous military.”42 The thought process is that by keeping 
armed forces hermetically separated from society, hobbled by restrictions on its rights 
and civil liberties, and focused on the development of its own distinct skill set, they are 
less inclined to interfere in the state’s political affairs.43 In this case, focus is levied 
against the rank and file military membership, who are both more difficult to supervise 
and outside the appointment/dismissal domain typical of subjective control.  
While Huntington and his followers traditionally chose to view the two spheres as 
formally distinct and separate entities, emphasizing civilian control of the military, a 
newer generation of scholars (to include Douglas Bland, Yehuda Ben-Meir and Rebecca 
Schiff) challenge the assumption that splitting the domains is the most effective 
approach. Ben-Meir, adopting a fusionist approach, believes that too much emphasis has 
been placed on the past separation of the armed forces and society. His position is that 
                                                 
41 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 83, 85; 
Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-military Relations,” 22; Feaver, “The Civil-military 
Problematique,” 160. According to Luckham, “there exist political constraints as well as reasons of 
profession self interest to keep the armed forces out of the struggle for political power.” Feaver opines that 
“objective control weakens the military politically without weakening it in military terms.”  
42 Stuart A. Cohen, “Changing Civil-military Relations in Israel,” 782. “An officer corps focused on 
its own professional tasks…would be politically neutral and less likely to intervene in politics.” 
43 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations, 83; 
Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, State and Society in Israel: 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 46–47; Feaver “The Civil-military Problematique,” 160. 
Huntington further opines that “civilian control of the military decreases as the military become 
progressively involved in institutional, class and constitutional politics.” Conversely, Feaver stipulates, 
“interference or meddling in military affairs undermines military professionalism and so undermines 
objective control.” 
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more focus needs to be placed on the interaction between the two domains, as “the 
military is constantly involved in the affairs of the state as is the civilian authority in the 
affairs and that this two-way influence is constant” (see Figure 244). 
 
 
Figure 2.   A Model of Civil-military Relations 
It is Ben-Meir’s opinion that “the threat to popular control is not from military 
adventurism or the warrior caste but rather from mutual meddling and the blurring of 
civil-military areas of special competence.”45 
According to Bland’s perspective on “shared responsibility,” a normative 
partnership exists between the two domains, as “civil-military relations are built on 
particular ideas that have evolved into principles, norms and rules embedded in 
                                                 
44 Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel, 4–5. The dotted line represents prohibited 
involvement. Blackened squares show the main areas of interest in civil-military relations. As 
demonstrated, government is involved in all four aspects of the relationship, while the military traditionally 
only functions in three. 
45 Ibid., 4. 
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institutions and reinforces by history, experience, and prejudice.”46 His baseline 
assumption is that older models are conceived with an exceedingly narrow focus, which, 
coupled with the undue influence of specific national and cultural proponents, skews 
theoretical outcomes.47 “The relationships and arrangement of responsibilities are 
conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of ‘principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around which actor expectations converge’.”48 His premise is that 
civilian direction is a more accurate terminology than civilian control, as it implies there 
is an inter-sphere relationship based on exchanges and interaction between “friendly 
adversaries.”49 As such, “the key to civil direction of the military is an effective 
accountability mechanism that enables the civil authority to hold military officers to 
account…against agreed upon standards.”50  
Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory adopts a constructivist approach, diverging 
from traditional realists in its explicit focus on domestic features. She examines actors 
and indicators as cultural, historical and institutional variables, rejecting the assumption 
that, 1) civilians must control the military or 2) there is a single, correct answer to all 
                                                 
46 Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 26, 
no. 1 (1999): 16.  
47 Ibid., 8. As an example, Bland laments the fact that attention is historically focused solely on coups, 
a narrow subset of civil-military relations. His position is that “they tend to overlook the other, perhaps 
more common civil-military problems confronting societies and their armed forces.”  
48 Ibid., 21. According to Bland, “civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the 
sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers.” 
49 Ibid., 18–19; Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, State and 
Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 45. According to Boene, Civil-military 
relations is not about controlling the armed forces, but incorporating it into both society and the political 
process via effective integration and coordination. 
50 Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-military Relations,” 20. “Where the accountability mechanism is 
strong and effective, control is strong and effective.” 
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individual cases.51 Instead, Schiff highlights dialogue, accommodation and shared values 
among society’s key components, contending that “three partners—the military, the 
political elites and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or 
may not involve separation but does not require it.”52 She utilizes four indicators in 
assessing the qualitative value of domestic civil-military relations, to include: 1) social 
composition of the officer corps, 2) political decision-making process, 3) recruitment 
method, and 4) military style.53 Ultimately, the objective of Concordance Theory is to 
demonstrate “the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among the 
military, the political elites, and society,” predicting that a diminished risk of military 
intervention results from increased cooperation and coordination between the three key 
components.54 
Another recent theoretical approach is the Peter Feaver’s application of Agency 
Model to civil-military relations.55 His point of departure (similar to Huntington) is that 
civilians must inherently control the military sector, in this case, via a principal-agent 
                                                 
51 Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed 
Forces & Society 22, no. 1 (1995): 7–24; Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal 
of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 461. Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations Revisited,” in Military, 
State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 65–66; Michael, “Military 
Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control,” 34. The novelty of Concordance Theory, particularly in relation to 
legacy models, is that it “considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations.” It also 
contradicts Harold Lasswell’s “Garrison State Theory,” which postulated that long-term exposure to 
external threats would eventually lead to the militarization of society writ large. It further speculated that 
“decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic, and institutional practices long connected with modern 
democracy will disappear.” In the case of Israel, this assumption has not been borne out, as the state and 
society remain firmly democratic. 
52 Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” 7, 11–13. 
Schiff defines each of the three principle components: 1) the armed forces are readily obvious, 2) the 
political leadership are elites who represent the government, and 3) the citizenry, who are most often 
omitted from traditional theories (although are, according to her, highly significant). 
53 Ibid., 8, 13–16. The social composition of a state’s officer corps can be either broad or narrow, 
depending on particular historical background and preferences. Budgetary issues and collusion between the 
government and military (resulting in a “military-industrial complex”) are often a function of the political 
process. Recruitment is a function of coercion (i.e., conscription) or persuasion (i.e., willing service through 
volunteerism). Finally, military style is the development of symbols and rituals, which develop as a result 
of history and culture. 
54 Ibid., 15. 
55 Feaver, An Agency Theory Explanation, 1–87; Boene, “Western-type Civil-military Relations 
Revisited,” in Military, State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 66–67; 
Michael, “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control,” 39; Kobi Michael, “The Dilemma behind the 
Classical Dilemma of Civil-military Relations: The “Discourse Space” Model and the Israeli Case during 
the Oslo Process,” Armed Forces and Society 33, no. 4 (2007): 520–522. 
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configuration.56 Feaver utilizes a binary game approach to determine the level military 
subordination via measurement of “work and shirk,” as well as expectations of possible 
detection and punishment.57 He seeks to include all formats and configurations, 
remaining agnostic regarding what is to be considered acceptable (or not). According to 
the author, Agency Model: 
treats civil-military relations as comprised of an ongoing series of strategic 
interactions. The interactions begin with civilians seeking to trade off the 
advantages of specialization against the disadvantages of agency. The 
advantages are that the military function can be performed by experts, 
freeing the time and energy of civilian masters for other tasks. The 
disadvantages are the ones inherent in any political relationship: will my 
representative truly serve my best interests or will he exploit his position 
to pursue selfish goals?58 
The model does appear to confirm Huntington’s perspective that an optimal 
environment is one where friction is minimized through military acquiescence to civil 
guidance, and is effective at explaining civil control over the military. Unfortunately, it 
has some significant shortcomings as well. Based principally on the U.S. paradigm, 
Huntington appears to discount the likelihood of either friction or military intervention 
once professionalization has been achieved. It also does not provide needed insight into 
nuanced levels of shirking, ranging from blatant to latent. Additionally, according to 
Kobi Michael, the Agency model, 1) makes the assumption that principals are rational 





                                                 
56 Feaver, An Agency Theory Explanation, 11. According to Feaver, “the Agency Model is able to 
incorporate Huntington’s argument. It confirms that Huntington’s theory is logically consistent about how 
Civil-military relations might have played out during the Cold War.” 
57 Ibid., 3–8. These terms are plays on colloquialisms, and merely serve to define compliance/non-
compliance of civilian directives. Both will have a bearing on the level of intrusive monitoring required, 
and to what degree this perceived micro-management will incite further friction on the part of the armed 
forces.  
58 Ibid., 2.  
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with output, fails to take into consideration precisely how the decision making process 
functions.59 Finally, in the Israeli case, it does little to explain the military’s influence 
over the decision-making and policy process. 
More recently, Kobi Michael proposed a new, Israeli-centric construct to explain 
why the Jewish State’s armed forces functioned as such a dominant partner through the 
years.60 His Discourse Space Model maintains that intellectual authority is the driving 
force behind a de facto civil-military partnership and that decision making is conducted 
in a discourse space alternatively referred to as a “black box” (see Figure 361). 
                                                 
59 Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-military Relations,” 521–522. 
Regarding the former, Michael notes that certain states (Israel among them) are characterized by “strategic 
helplessness,” whereby civil leadership has little capability of formulating or articulating long-term or 
strategic goals.  
60 Ibid., 521, 525; Michael, “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control,” 47. According to 
Michael, “It is true that all of the military’s activities are done with the permission and the authorization of 
the political level, but in most cases, the political directives are derived from the military knowledge 
infrastructure, hegemonic knowledge that has almost no competitors.” 
61 Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil--Military Relations,” 525. The 
“black box problem” is the process of civil-military relations is distilled down to a level of intellectual 
encounters between the echelons. Whichever has the ability to develop recognized expertise in a given field 
will become the de facto principle in the relationship dynamic.  
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Figure 3.   Overview of Discourse Space Model 
In his theory, public discourse is the key to determining who will control the civil-
military dynamic via competition for the population’s perception/opinion.62 In the Israeli 
case, the civilian government’s failure to develop or maintain the perception of adequate  
 
                                                 
62 Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil--Military Relations,” 521. “If the 
agent…holds the unique position of being able to influence public discourse, then it maintains a degree of 
influence over the decision-making process.” 
 26
security-related expertise relegates it to a subordinate status.63 Michael further elaborates 
that both functional expansion and necessity have rendered the IDF an “epistemic 
authority” in the eyes of the population.64  
  
                                                 
63 Michael, “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control,” 28. The theory breaks down inputs into 
the system into: 1) political, 2) military, and 3) interactions between the domains. In the case of Israel, the 
civilian leadership has voluntarily abrogated its control over security policy due to its dependency on the 
IDF for institutional knowledge regarding security matters. The military responds by providing both 
intelligence and strategic planning, for which no comparable infrastructure exists within the civilian 
domain. Finally, interaction between the domains is a function of fragmented boundaries, which lead to 
inherently close ties. Senior IDF officials routinely participate in Cabinet meetings, and there is a similarity 
of perspective due to routine migration of military officers into the public domain. 
64 Ibid., 33. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, “Israel's 'Security Network' and its Impact: An 
Exploration of a New Approach,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): 242. 
Michael attributes his definition of epistemic authority to Arie Kruglanski’s Lay Epistemic and Human 
Knowledge: Cognitive and Motivational Bases (New York, 1989). It states, “the information source that the 
individual relies on when he tries to acquire and internalize knowledge about defined issues. Individuals 
tend to believe that experts are right because they are experts. Consequently, individuals tend to appraise 
expert views as valid and reliable.” This ultimately results in an information dependency on those 
perceived as knowledgeable regarding important issues (i.e., the IDF and national security in Israel). 
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III. PRINCIPAL ENABLERS OF THE ISRAELI POLITICAL-
MILITARY SYSTEM: SOCIETY, POLITICS AND THE MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
A. INTRODUCTION  
While Kenneth Waltz and the Neo-Realists would likely choose to examine Israel 
at the macro level as a unitary/rational actor, this undervalues the importance of domestic 
players, ideology and personalities in civil-military relations. Hassan Barari, therefore, 
refutes the contention that only state-level participants play an important role in foreign 
policy making.65  
Unfortunately, the focus on Israel traditionally devolves away from the domestic 
picture, where “the inability to create policy has been aggravated by political 
fragmentation…caused by the electoral system and reflects a society marked by political, 
social, ethnic and religious divisions.”66 Rather, the nature of the country’s security 
dilemma has perennially affected sub-actors in the developmental structure, all of whom 
have an impact on the nature, composition and functionality of the system’s evolution. 
The three principle components are, 1) the populace and 2) a political system that defers 
policy decisions to the state’s defense establishment, and 3) a gradually evolving 
economy historically tethered to its own military-industrial complex (MIC).  
Notably, a shift in domestic influence and direction can be traced to the aftermath 
of 1967’s “Six Day” War. The perception of long-term conflict shifted from wars of 
“necessity” to wars of “choice,” profoundly affecting population’s view of threat and 
                                                 
65 Hassan Barari, “Israel and the Decline of the Peace Process, 1996–2003,” The Emirates Occasional 
Papers 51 (2003): 3–4. According to Barari, “a democratically elected government cannot reach an 
agreement with another country’s government without taking into account its domestic political milieu.” As 
such, intenal concerns and constituencies will ultimately undermine international progress even if Israel’s 
senior leadership were in favor of a given issue (i.e., willing to invest the necessary capital). Domestic 
debate regarding peace has served to polarize Israeli politicians and society, while terrorism inherently 
drives both toward the right of the political spectrum.  
66 Ibid., 3. Barari firmly believes that domestic politics must be taken into consideration. Anecdotally, 
he states, “ideological preferences and the changing dynamics of domestic politics have influenced the 
public debate in Israel on the future of the territories seized in 1967.” 
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security.67 The accompanying second and third order effects rippled across the civil, 
political, and economic realms, facilitating a reevaluation of Israel’s early guiding 
principles (i.e., collectivism, Statism, “no choice,” etc.). The strategic surprise and loss of 
life inflicted on Israel during the 1973 War cemented this change in mindset, 
demonstrating that the various systemic components were evolving in both outlook and 
prioritization. In subsequent years: 1) the Israeli population has become less willing to 
bear the personal costs of an interminable conflict, particularly as permeability between 
the spheres has decreased, 2) the political apparatus has become increasingly polarized 
and fragmented, and 3) the economy has shifted toward privatization and market 
freedom. While no one of these components (in and of themselves) are noteworthy as a 
harbinger of wide scale civil-military re-orientation, taken collectively, they do indicate 
gradual evolution underway within Israel.  
B. ISRAELI SOCIETY—MOBILIZATION AND RESPONSE TO 
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 
As noted, the conflict between Israel and its foes can be deemed of an intractable 
nature. According to Daniel Bar-Tal, experiences of this sort are characterized as 
“protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total and central.”68 Threat is 
considered the key variable, whereby Israel must maintain constant vigilance and 
preparation for war, orienting a significant portion of her manpower and financial 
resources toward security matters. This is the result of continuous clashes, which have 
been “exhausting, demanding, stressful, painful and costly—in human terms as well as 
material terms.”69 As such, many in the Israeli public harbor an innate fear and distrust of 
the Arab world, viewing the struggle as one of life versus death.70 Concurrently, the 
conflict’s extended duration has resulted in a sense of war fatigue, whereby “erosion and 
                                                 
67 The 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars were all perceived as wars of necessity and survival. Conversely, the 
1956 and 1982 wars (and all operations since) are seen as wars of choice, seeking to achieve specific 
political goals.  
68 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case,” International 
Journal of Conflict Management (1997–2002) 9, no. 1 (1998): 27–28.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Gad Barzilai, “War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective,” 
Comparative Politics 31, no. 3 (1999): 329.  
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weariness set in due to Israel’s succession of wars.”71 Asher Arian states that Israeli Jews 
believe “the onus of Israel’s security position is obvious,” but despite the enduring 
security challenges, they will ultimately prevail in overcoming these threats.72  
Attempts to cope with intractable hostility are spread across the Israeli spectrum, 
encompassing military, political, economic, societal and psychological convictions.73 
Society’s shared belief system is structured in such a way as to instill behavioral traits, 
which mitigate the conflict’s negative effects through coping mechanisms. The three 
notable examples put forth by Asher Arian include: 1) “perceived success,” 2) “denial” 
and 3) “a people apart.”74 The first centers around the Israeli expectation of military 
success, based on past historical examples. Secondly, the concept of “ein brera” (no 
choice) acted as a means of filtering out information deemed unnecessary for the cause’s 
positive advancement. A function of maintaining the proper perspective, this often led to 
“tunnel vision” on the part of the population. Finally, the historical notion of “a people 
apart” sanctified Israel through nationalist and religious symbolism by excluding all 
“others,” reinforcing the normative value of Israeli solidarity.  
The Israeli defense model/military system arose in direct response to the 
conflict’s duration and violence, a function of society’s unique response to it. Defined by 
permeability between the defense and civilian spheres, securitization rapidly evolved as 
                                                 
71 Gad Barzilai, Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel,  27–28. Israel has been a party to six periods of 
major military action over its 61 years, coupled with innumerable smaller engagements. The relative cost in 
terms of manpower, damage, and lost economic efficiency has been quite high. 
72 Asher Arian, “A People Apart: Coping with National Security Problems in Israel,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (1989): 605, 609. He further elaborates on the “cognitive harmony between 
feelings of being threatened and of believing in the country’s ability to overcome.”  
73 Bar-Tal, “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: the Israeli Case,” 27. This was “based on 
the perceived conflict-dominate reality which was harsh, violent and threatening. The intractable 
conflict…was real for Israeli Jews, who made every effort to adapt to it.” Bar-Tal provides a listing of such 
beliefs, to include: 1) the justness of one’s own goals, 2) security, 3) delegitimizing one’s opponent, 4) 
creation of a positive self image, 5) self-victimization, 6) patriotism, 7) unity, and 8) one’s own wish for 
peace.  
74 Arian, “A People Apart,” 608–612, 621. 
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the central thematic tenet within the Jewish State.75 This is most apparent in general 
mobilization under the construct of “nation-in-arms,” whereby society as a whole bears 
the brunt of defending the state.76 It has been further demonstrated in the practices of: 1) 
universal conscription, 2) military “role expansion” into the civilian domain, and 3) high 
levels of prestige afforded the IDF. As such, there exists a symbiotic relationship between 
the IDF and the populace, with the former acting as a unifying force for society as a 
whole.77 
The very foundation of the “people’s army” concept was based on a near 
universal conscription policy established under the 1949 Defense Service Law.78 It was a 
response by Israel’s early leadership to the state’s quantitative inferiority relative to its 
Arab adversaries, coupled with the conflict’s extended duration. As such, a tiered system 
was devised, through which, 1) the utilization limited manpower and resources could be 
optimized and 2) the economy could be partially shielded from lengthy/costly 
                                                 
75 Micha Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: 
Insights from the Israeli Experience, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson, and Aharon Klieman (Stamford: 
JAI Press, 1998): 169–170. Popper alludes to bi-directional permeability.  While the IDF is influenced by 
its foundation as a largely conscript/reserve-based force, organizational character is also imparted on its 
members, who “can be expected to absorb at least some of the IDF’s social values and perceptions, which 
they will then carry back to their civilian lives.” 
76 Bar-Tal, “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case,” 27.  
77 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 167–168; Michael Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and 
Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977,” World Politics 42, no. 4 (1990): 540. According 
to Popper, the IDF served as a symbolic representation of society’s major values and ideals. As such, it 
became the focal point of “symbolic order,” whereby the Israeli public demonstrated a reverence based on 
“wisdom, intuition, [and] exceptional understanding.” Barnett further explains, “the nation-state and the 
mass army appear together, the twin tokens of citizenship within territorially bounded political 
communities…Military service as a hallmark of citizenship and citizenship as the hallmark of a political 
democracy.” These are concepts rooted in European history and practice, descending most notably from the 
French Revolution. 
78 Ibid., 558; Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2005), 326. Importantly, Arian notes that conscription is not completely universal, as 1) Yeshiva 
students are deferred or exempt from active service and 2) the reserves (as 70% of the manpower pool) are 
manned by roughly 20% of the population. This latter point is also reflective of the IDF’s increasing 
professionalism, coupled with a surplus of manpower due to increased Russian immigration at the Cold 
War’s conclusion. 
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disruptions.79 Under a “convergent” arrangement, the burden was broadly levied across 
society, and was interpreted as a patriotic rite of passage for generations of Israelis.80  
Concurrently, careers in the IDF are of relatively short duration, resulting from 
what Micha Popper refers to as a “calling” versus “profession” model.81 The intent was 
to inhibit the development of cliques or a praetorian class, as officers retire at a young 
age and do not morph into a potential rival for elected leadership. They subsequently 
move laterally to seek second careers in positions of civic influence, jumping from the 
top of one command structure (i.e., the military) to that of another (i.e., politics, business, 
etc.). This distinctly Israeli phenomenon is euphemistically referred to as “parachuting,” 
whereby senior officers rapidly commence alternate careers at the conclusion of their 
military service.82 According to Joel Beinin, there has long existed a “political tradition 
of regarding senior officers as uniquely capable leaders in civilian political life despite 
their lack of any significant non-military experience.”83 This trend originated in the early 
1960s, as Israel’s founders departed political life and were replaced by the first 
                                                 
79 Stuart A. Cohen, “The Peace Process and Its Impact on the Development of a 'Slimmer and Smarter' 
Israel Defence Force,” Israel Affairs 1, no. 4 (1995): 2–3; Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt, and Andrew 
Bacevich, “Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs,” Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 48–49; Barzilai, “War, 
Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective,” 329. “In combat Israel is forced to 
mobilize up to more than 90 percent … of its fighting age manpower.” Over the long term, this could have 
significant impact on both the society and economy. See Chapter IV for additional details regarding the 
specific nuances of Israel’s tiered military structure. 
80 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 169–170; Cohen, “Slimmer & Smarter,” 15. Convergence represents a system 
where permeability exists between a society’s military and civilian spheres, and a small, professional corps 
is augmented by a large, civilianized force. This connectivity is in direct opposition to a “divergent” model 
(such as the UK), where both domains are relatively insulated from one another (a function of volunteerism 
vice conscription). 
81 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 171–172. Under this premise, officers view themselves as an elite, serving the 
greater good of the nation as a function of dedication and patriotism. This is poignantly illustrated in Mati 
Peled’s statement “we saw ourselves as defenders of the nation. We had no intention of becoming 
professional army officers.”  
82 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 89. Both MAPAI/LABOR and HERUT/LIKUD 
have succeeded in wooing like-minded officers at the conclusion of their careers. The former were able to 
entice Moshe Dayan, Yitchak Rabin, and Yitzchak Mordechai, while the latter received the support of 
Chaim Weizman, Ariel Sharon, and Shaul Mofaz.  
83 Joel Beinin, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict: 50 Years of 
Jewish Statehood,” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 3 (1998): 107. According to Beinin, one-third of all 
generals and one-fifth of all officers above Colonel retired and embarked on political careers upon military 
retirement. 
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generation of IDF leadership (simultaneously retiring from the armed forces).84 A 
precedent was thus established, dividing government and society between those who 
served and those who did not. While there has never been consensus among military 
officers (either in or out of uniform), mitigating the possibility of a unified position 
against the elected leadership, interconnections between the armed forces and civilian 
sectors are both innate and robust.  
The civil-military system is also unique in the IDF’s “role expansion” into what 
would normally be considered civilian responsibilities, to include: 1) education, 2) 
engineering and infrastructure, 3) medicine, and 4) culture (see Figure 485). 
 
Figure 4.   Examples of IDF Role Expansion into Israeli Society 
                                                 
84 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 88–89. By the 1960s, “the aging and retirement of 
the traditional political leadership and the retirement in their mid-forties of a generation of defense and 
army leaders due to the early retirement policy of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The apex of the political 
pyramid was vacated just as the apex of the military pyramid was being rejuvenated. It was only natural for 
experienced army officers…to assume positions of responsibility and authority in politics.” 
85 Alex Mintz, “The Military-Industrial Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 4 (1985): 626–627, 634; Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second 
Republic, 327; Lissak, “The Unique Approach to Military-societal Relations in Israel,” 241–242; Lissak, 
“A Militaristic Society or a Democracy in Uniform,” 418, 425; Sucharov, “Security Ethics and the Modern 
Military: The Case of the Israel Defense Forces,” 183–184; Cohen, “Slimmer & Smarter,” 6. 
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This broadly interpreted responsibility stemmed from an early desire on the part of David 
Ben-Gurion to utilize the military as society’s unifying element. With a large influx of 
refugees and immigrants during Israel’s formative years, coupled with finite government 
resources stretched to the breaking point, the IDF assumed a central role by providing 
services unavailable elsewhere. While the level of responsibility has fluctuated 
throughout the years, diminishing with budgetary reductions and trends toward increasing 
professionalism, it initially served to cement the relationship between civilian and 
military domains.  
The interactive system also long fostered a high regard for the armed forces 
among Israeli society.86 This resulted from repeated superior performance in battle, 
patriotism, and the military’s identification with the state. According to Asher Arian, “the 
dominant values of the country are reflected in the army, and vice versa.”87 Prestige 
peaked with the 1967 War and remained high until 1973, at which point, it began to ebb 
in the aftermath of a perceived political-military fiasco.88  
The downward trend accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s following the First 
Lebanon War, as negative public perception of military service and the IDF’s 
deteriorating level of charisma became more pronounced. As the conventional threat to 
Israel diminished, and the population lost its early sense of fear, collectivism and 
patriotism (in lieu of growing self interest), a new perspective on defense emerged. 




                                                 
86 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 267–268. Popper presents findings of a 1992 study indicating the Israeli public, 
notoriously suspicious of government institutions, “expressed almost unqualified faith (over 90%—‘great 
faith’) in the IDF.” 
87 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 327. 
88 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 176. “Although Israel eventually won that war, the surprise attack, the unreadiness 
of the army, and the initial confusion and great loss of life revealed the generals’ clay feet.” 
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the IDF was at its most charismatic in Israel’s early days, when it 
projected a sense of security, of knowing the right way, at a time when the 
citizens of the newly created state felt that they and the state were both in 
constant danger of extinction. After the Six-Day War, Israelis’ perceptions 
of their country changed. From seeing Israel as a tiny, beleaguered state, 
they came to see it as a strong, unvanquished country, rich in sophisticated 
know-how and technology.89 
This was further exacerbated by budgetary constrictions, which sought to professionalize 
the IDF and contract its role within society writ large, a substantive departure from the 
early days.90 The former threatens to drive a wedge between the population and military, 
shifting the armed forces from their role as central, socializing agent.91 The latter 
indicates significant responsibilities have passed back to a public sector already 
constrained by budgetary, defense and societal issues. That said, Asher Arian still 
believes the IDF has a noteworthy role to play, opining, “military service is still an 
important requisite for many positions of power and importance in Israeli life.”92  
C. THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM—FRAGMENTATION IS THE 
NAME OF THE GAME 
When examining the Israeli political system, close attention must be paid to the 
intersection between domestic policies and the security domain due to the ongoing nature 
and duration of conflict to which the state is exposed. Arian believes that “the centrality 
of the defense issue in Israel is maintained by leaders of the major political parties,” 
principally through their utilization of the armed forces as a policy instrument.93 It was a 
disparate collection of armed Zionist factions, united under central political leadership, 
                                                 
89 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 176. 
90 Cohen, “Slimmer & Smarter,” 7–9.  
91 Popper, “The Israeli Defense Forces as a Socialization Agent,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, 178. Popper believes, “The army is in transition from a model in which it was the 
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92 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 324–326.  
93 Ibid. “Defense policy provides the best example of an institutional interest in the Israeli political 
system.” 
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which successfully established and defended the fledgling state. This inherently linked 
the government, party and armed forces (re-designated the IDF) as de facto partners, 
quite unlike other democracies. Despite preliminary attempts to subordinate the military 
to civilian rule, early civilian leadership opted to follow the British tradition of 
maintaining relationships based on custom and tradition vice formalized legal standing (a 
function of the lack of a written constitution). This is most clearly demonstrated in the 
nature of the DEFMIN, who functions more accurately as a liaison to the military vice its 
civilian leader.94 This was a byproduct of endemic politicization and a failure to 
distinguish boundaries adequately, whereby the IDF “ultimately became an army 
working as a partner in the political process, integrated with the civil power even beyond 
the national-security field.”95 As civilian leadership has an inherent need to focus on 
external threats and the mobilization of internal capacity simultaneously, it is necessary 
to negotiate with domestic actors in an effort to prepare for inevitable hostilities.96 As 
such, “the interaction between domestic politics and security affairs has been overlooked 
by most analysts in the international security field.”97 
Another notable feature of the Israeli political system is the high degree of 
fragmentation, coalition-building, and sheer number of parties involved; the result of an 
unwieldy application of PR elections.98 According to Barari, “the huge number of Israeli 
                                                 
94 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 334. “The defense minister is an extremely 
important actor in Israeli politics because of the centrality of the defense issue, but the Defense Ministry as 
an implement of civilian control is relatively unimportant.”  
95 Ibid., 330, 332. “The lines of demarcation between the civil and military are not clear partially 
because the army is such an integral part of Israeli civil society and partially because basic institutions of 
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96 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
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28–29; Barari, “Israel and the Decline of the Peace Process, 1996–2003,” 15–17; Arian, Politics in Israel: 
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parties represented in the Knesset have left a profound impact on the way the government 
is formed.”99 This is a function of exceedingly low election threshold requirements for 
party participation in government, whereby a two percent return affords entrance for 
fringe elements.100 Voting is conducted via list format, vice direct selection, with the 
proportionate number of candidates from each party determining the Knesset’s 
composition.101  
As such, government by coalition and coalition management are crucial to 
understanding how the system functions concerning civil-military relations, as there has 
never been outright control exercised by any one party. The two major players must rely 
on the assistance and support of like-minded allies, with the trend toward consolidation of 
blocs commencing by 1965.102 Politicians expend as much energy managing these 
coalitions as participating in policy and legislative processes, whereby, 1) conflicting 
agendas often poison the strategy and efforts of senior leaders and 2) the military 
submission of singular recommendations (typically, the middle of the road approach) is 
received as a fait accompli. Upon reaching critical mass, the defection of one party (or 
more) from the partnership can spell the end of an administration, leaving it open to a 
possible no-confidence vote. This has perpetuated an environment where smaller, fringe 
elements have amassed a disproportionate level of influence as king-makers.103  
                                                 
99 Barari, “Israel and the Decline of the Peace Process, 1996–2003,” 17. 
100 Ibid.; Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 203; Shahar Ilan, “Knesset Panel Okays 
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Other traits of the system include: 1) de facto political fiefdoms, where individual 
ministers function in autonomous environments of self-interest,104 2) a bloated cabinet 
structure meant to increase coalition size, yet decrease the PM’s influence, 3) elitism 
manifest in a rigid hierarchical pecking order, where “a party, a politician, and a citizen 
all tend to know their place in the power structure and rarely overreach themselves,”105 
and 4) a universally negative opinion of/disdain for politicians among the Israeli 
population.106 The latter case was a byproduct of the apparatchik model, whereby politics 
became a profession in and of itself, with party members seeking to climb the career 
ladder as a function of longevity (similar to the Soviet system).107 
Historically, Israeli politics were born into a system dominated by single-party 
control for the state’s first 29 years. This was an outgrowth of early MAPAI/LABOR 
hegemony within the Zionist movement’s party politics.108 The unique nature of this 
environment tied the center-left party organization to both the state’s apparatus (by 
extension, the IDF) and the labor movement (via the Histadrut109), providing an 
extraordinary degree of control over policy, security and economic interests. This 
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“dominant party system” continued in effect until 1977, remaining remarkably stable 
over a prolonged timeframe. Despite periodic ideological fragmentation, political 
defections, and opposition challenges, MAPAI/LABOR continued to function as the 
dominant political player. It thrived (in part) due to a rigid structure in which “society 
tends to be held together by the hierarchies that serve as the principle links between 
government and citizen.110  
Over time, the party moderated its position as a function of the political process, 
elevating nationalism and pragmatism over socialist idealism. Arian states, “the socialist 
ethic that ruled for decades has withered, although some signs of it can still be found. The 
element of nationalism, on the other hand, has retained its intensity, if not 
strengthened.”111 Concurrently, MAPAI/LABOR peaked by 1969 and gradually lost 
influence over time, a function of: 1) creeping malaise and loss of fervor, 2) “crises of 
succession,” 3) poor policy management and corruption, 4) war-weariness (particularly in 
the aftermath of the 1973), and 5) an opposition party that finally developed a sufficient 
measure of support and legitimacy (during the 1967 War).112 By 1977, an era of bi-polar 
politics commenced with the momentous electoral loss to Menachem Begin.113 
HERUT/LIKUD existed as the perennial opposition party in the Israeli system, 
demonstrating diametric opposition within the Zionist political spectrum. This was a 
carryover from the Yishuv days, playing political foil to MAPAI/LABOR and foretelling 
the evolution of a bipolar model. Its founder, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, ascribed to a revisionist 
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113 Ibid., 125, 127. According to Arian, a dominant party will ultimately bring about its own demise, 
rather than the actions of the opposition. In the case of MAPAI/LABOR, the 1973 War shocked the Israeli 
psyche, raising questions about the nation’s Political-military capabilities. While the party’s power and 
influence had been in steady decline, this incident (more than any other), crystallized the public’s 
frustration. It would have a significant impact on voting four years later, turning many moderates against 
MAPAI/LABOR and delivering Begin to prominence.  
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form of Zionism, calling for the application of an “iron wall,” through which Jewish 
military strength would be used to regain all of biblical Eretz Yisrael. He believed that 
the Arabs would eventually come to the realization that Israel could not be defeated, at 
which point they could be integrated into society as equals. This was characterized by the 
use of violence (via the IRGUN) during the waning Mandate period, against British, 
Arabs and even rival Jews.  
Jabotinsky also believed that the Zionist mission should focus on efforts to 
cultivate the middle classes, in direct contradiction to Ben-Gurion’s socialist model of 
supporting the working class. This earned him (and Begin, his successor) the latter’s 
lasting enmity, which was carried into the political process upon Israel’s formation.114 By 
the 1960s, HERUT/LIKUD gained status as a legitimate opposition party, with 
Menachem begin entering the 1967 National Unity Government just prior to the war. 
Throughout the 1970s, it was clear that MAPAI/LABOR was losing its grip on political 
hegemony, and moderate party defections made a right wing victory possible. Ironically, 
HERUT/LIKUD shifted to a more pragmatic approach regarding peace and security, with 
Begin relinquishing the Sinai Desert during the Camp David Accords. This has enabled 
the party to mitigate MAPAI/LABOR’s former hegemonic position, maintaining relative 
parity over the majority of the next 25 years (see Figure 5115). 
                                                 
114 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 141–144. There were several examples of 
animosity between the two leaderships boiling over, particularly concerning Ben-Gurion and Begin. Most 
notable was the “Altelena Affair” when, in 1948, the Israeli government ordered the IDF to fire on an 
IRGUN/HERUT ship carrying arms and supplies. Ben-Gurion had wisely merged all political militias into 
a unitary defense force, and this political challenge was a key barometer in determining how the fledgling 
state’s response to organized (and potentially violent) dissent. While the matter was resolved, and the Irgun 
peacefully disbanded (morphing into HERUT), the psychological effects were lasting. According to Arian, 
“The causes of the antagonisms have faded, but the mutual recriminations and passionate expressions of 
political views have been passed to the next generation.” 
115 Ibid., 118. The trend demonstrates a pattern of diminishing support for MAPAI/LABOR from 
1969 onward (1992 was the outlier). Concurrently, HERUT/LIKUD’s popularity rose through the 1970s, 
before suffering a setback following the 1982 Lebanon invasion. Since then, relative parity within the 
system has restricted either party from assuming a dominant position. 
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Figure 5.   Knesset Results for Labor and Likud, 1965–2003 
This shift was predominantly a function of multiple parties gaining influence in 
the system. While MAPAI/LABOR and HERUT/LIKUD remained the two principle 
actors, a host of outlier entities contributed to the fractious and dysfunctional nature of 
the process (running the gamut from left to extreme right, secular to religious). The 
“liberals” tended to resemble middle of the road, European style parties. They changed 
coalitions several times, with a segment affiliating with HERUT/LIKUD and another 
disappearing into obscurity.116 The center-left “Centrists” were highly pragmatic idealists 
who broke with LABOR/MAPAI leadership during several key periods.117 According to 
Arian, they “attempted to fill the political and ideological middle ground between what 
they saw as a decaying LABOR party and an irresponsible and out-of-touch LIKUD,” but 
would return to the fold or evaporate when unable to challenge the “big two”118 Finally, 
religious parties (relative late-comers to the political arena), can be found in varying 
                                                 
116 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 142–143.  
117 Ibid., 157–161. There were three distinct, internal challenges to MAPAI/LABOR. In 1965, Ben-
Gurion and Dayan (central figures) broke with the party to establish RAFI. Most eventually merged back in 
with MAPAI to form the LABOR coalition. In 1977, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) broke 
from LABOR’s periphery, enabling HERUT/LIKUD to win the election. Finally, in 2003, Shinui diverged 
to run on an anti-religious platform (winning big). 
118 Ibid., 157. 
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flavors, ranging from the Zionist-affiliated to anti-nationalistic/messianic. These groups 
tend to be self-contained entities, wielding disproportionate influence on the political 
system due to the nature of party coalitions.119  
From a political-military perspective, this fragmentation led to the strategic 
helplessness, described by Kobi.120 Efforts to reform the system have, to date, been 
marginally successful (at best). The institution of higher thresholds for political inclusion 
will go some way toward diffusing the power of smaller entities by decreasing 
fragmentation and restoring a measure of influence to the larger parties. Unfortunately, 
attempts to revamp either the election process or general political culture have (thus far) 
been dismal failures. The voting reform of 1996, allowing the direct selection of a PM for 
the first time, was an effort to bolster the position’s power relative to the Knesset. An 
unexpected byproduct of the change was diminished support for the LABOR and LIKUD 
blocs, with additional seats won by the fringe groups.121 By 2003, the system became so 
dysfunctional that it was scrapped in favor of a return to the pre-1996 model.  
D. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AS AN ECONOMIC DRIVER 
Israel’s founders envisioned an economic model where the sub-segments of 
capital, labor and defense were nationalized and merged, with two objectives in mind, 1) 
survival of the state and 2) furtherance of the party.122 According to Yair Aharoni, the 
                                                 
119 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 150–157. Over recent years, religious 
parties have become a formidable political force, amassing the third highest percentage of votes and 
traditionally siding with the winning coalition. The larger blocs curry favor among these groups by offering 
perks, such as IDF exemptions, special schools and economic incentives. Furthermore, “religious parties in 
Israel today are the clearest case of total inter-penetration of religious, social, cultural, political and often 
economic life.”  
120 Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-military Relations,” 521–522. As 
noted earlier. 
121 Barari, “Israel and the Decline of the Peace Process, 1996–2003,” 16. “The new system produced 
exactly the opposite of what was intended. It boosted the representation of smaller parties and 
simultaneously shrank the size of the bigger ones.” 
122 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 547–549; Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 127–129. “In the 
first years of Israel’s existence, the economic system was highly politicized, and political parties controlled 
most of the resource allocation.” As such, it was Ben-Gurion’s goal to see the nationalization of 
employment, education and health, while the military would be excluded from the political process. 
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initial operating environment founded during the Yishuv period was highly politicized.123 
The government/party were the key actors, gradually accumulating hegemonic control 
over human and production capital. This was vital in shoring up the fledgling country 
during its early years. Unfortunately, Israel possesses few natural resources, and has 
perennially been saddled with a prohibitively expensive defense burden as a percentage 
of its GDP (see Figures 6124, 7125, and 8126).  
 
 
Figure 6.   Expensive Defense Burden as a Percentage of its GDP 
                                                 
123 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 65. According to Arian, there was a “tremendous 
concentration of power and resources in the hands of a very small number of politicians and civil servants.” 
124 Ibid., 71; Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 130–131; Beinin, “Political 
Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict,” 124; Mintz, “The Military-Industrial 
Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,” 628. Figure 6 provides a general comparison of Israeli 
defense spending relative to contemporary Western democracies. As a function of GDP, this burden 
fluctuated between 21.7% and 32.8% (1968–1985), according to Beinin. Determining an accurate figure is 
difficult to assess, as universal conscription and extended reserve duty have a skewing effect on 
productivity and labor value. 
125 Hanan Sher, “Facets of the Israeli Economy—The Defense Industry,” June 1, 2002, Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, September 20 2009, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Facets+of+the+Israeli+Economy-
+The+Defense+Industr.htm (accessed September 20, 2009), 6; Moti Bassok, “Defense Budget to Grow, 
Education Spending to Shrink,” October 9, 2009, Ha'aretz, October 1, 2009, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1117753.html (accessed October 9, 2009), 1. This chart is a snapshot 
in time designed to depict a relative comparison between Israel and several Western states. More recently, 
Moti Bassok reports that while the percentage of Israeli GDP allocated to defense spending has continued 
to decline (currently projected at 6.3% for 2010), the absolute amount of spending in real terms is steadily 
climbing (48.6 billion shekels in 2009, and 53.2 billion shekels in 2010). This reflects broad growth in the 
Israeli economy, vice contraction of defense spending. 
126 “Arming Up: The World's Biggest Military Spenders by Population,” June 8 2009, The Economist, 
November 5, 2009, www.theeconomist.com (accessed November 5, 2009), 1. This chart demonstrates the 
per capita level of defense spending based on population size.  
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Figure 7.   National Domestic Defense Spending (% GDP) 
 
Figure 8.   Top 15 Military Spenders 
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In response, the state was forced to rely on a tenuous combination of internal and external 
funding sources. The former included: 1) donations from world Jewry, 2) reparation 
payments from the Federal Republic of Germany, and 3) growing assistance from the 
United States.127 The latter, placed a heavy tax burden on Israeli citizens themselves, 
who accepted it as necessary evil.128 Assets were then centralized; applied to maximize 
employment and security with little regard for efficiency. Fiscal policy was “shaped by 
both the underlying distribution of societal power and the state’s institutional capacities 
that enable it to penetrate, extract from and monitor society.”129 The economic effort was 
thus characterized by three distinct spheres of ownership within the overarching model, 
including: 1) public, accounting for the largest percentage of expenditures, 2) Histadrut, 
the workers’ organization, was tethered to the MAPAI/LABOR party and had enormous 
influence through the 1980s, and 3) private, comprised of small/medium firms (until 
recently).130  
The majority of capital and means of production were initially controlled by the 
government, with arms industries placed under the purview of the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD). While state and production sources are typically separated in democracies, a 
concern over foreign reliance convinced early leadership that “industrial development  
 
 
                                                 
127 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 547–549; Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 49, 72–74; Beinin, “Political 
Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict,” 102, 109. According to Beinin, “in 1950–
1955, 45 percent of all unilateral capital transfers to Israel came from world Jewry.” This allowed for an 
early growth period without the need for repayment, enabling increased focus on domestic defense 
spending. 
128 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 76; Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of 
Israel,” 130. The public itself was seen as domestic capital, and only through maximized economic effort 
(i.e., optimal employment) could they be fully brought to bear.  
129 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 558. 
130 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 131–132; Arian, Politics in Israel: The 
Second Republic, 57. 
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and defense requirements are intertwined.”131 Thus was born a unique hybrid, the Israeli 
version of the military-industrial complex (MIC). According to Alex Mintz, the 
development of such a self-contained/actuating entity:  
should be viewed as a very powerful interest group, enjoying significant 
autonomy in its activities, attaining the top priority accorded to security in 
Israel, and lacking sufficient external control and supervision. It emerged 
out of a real external security threat, reflecting the belief that Israel must 
supply its own military needs as much as possible.132  
The MIC heavily influenced government policy, and became a dominant factor in the 
Israeli economy by the early 1970s.133 This was partially a response to political 
sensitivity regarding the economic well being of large defense companies, as well as 
means of ensuring an optimal level of political support from the population prior to 
elections.134 
From a positive aspect, the MIC: 1) functioned as economic engine for the state, 
employing approximately 25 percent of the industrial workforce, 2) improved the 
qualitative process by incorporating high technology, creativity and innovation, 3) 
expanded the number of tangentially-related civilian businesses via second- and third-
                                                 
131 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 539, 547–549, 553–554; Mintz, “The Military-industrial Complex: American 
Concepts and Israeli Realities,” 626, 630–631, 634. “Comprises the military bureaucracy, the defense 
industries, the Ministries of Defense and political representatives.” 
132 Yaacov Lifshitz, “Security and the National Economy,” in Security Concerns: Insights from the 
Israeli Experience, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson, and Aharon Klieman (Stamford: JAI Press, 1998), 
317. Lifshitz concurs, stating, “the establishment of a military military-industrial base…was accorded high 
priority and was considered a central measure to release Israel from absolute dependency on foreign supply 
for arms.” The Jewish state initially had difficulty securing a reliable external arms supplier, and remained 
leery of excessive reliance on external benefactors.  
133 Beinin, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict,” 114. “Military 
production enterprises formed the largest concentration of industrial capital, employed the largest bloc of 
industrial labor…and constituted the largest group of industrial exporters.” 
134 Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, “The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel,” The 
American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 522–523, 531. Regarding the former, conspiracy 
theory contends that poor economic showing by these companies leads to new rounds of defense spending. 
Regarding the latter, the political process was intimately intertwined with the business cycles within the 
MIC. Increased spending would stimulate jobs, which could be expected to translate into more party votes. 
Additionally, appearing tough on security via strong defense budgets was traditionally well received.  
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order effects, and 4) augmented foreign trade via increased exports.135 Mintz also 
believed the conglomeration was significantly less hawkish than its American 
counterpart, with primacy focused on profit margin rather than national strategy and 
policy influence.136 
The MIC also presented a litany of less-than-optimal considerations for the 
Jewish state. By tying up huge amounts of resources in military-related production, the 
growth of consumer/private production was significantly retarded. Not only were labor 
prices/wages maintained at an artificially high level via government-HISTADRUT-
business collusion, efficiency was reduced by the delayed entry of Israelis into the job 
market due to conscription (as well as reserve duty absences). Ironically, while military 
service was seen as a ticket to social and economic mobility, many employers would 
choose to hire those not eligible for the IDF.137  
By the early 1970s, the government opted to move away from direct control of the 
production process and allow for implementation of some privatization.138 This was a 
function of: 1) skyrocketing defense costs, 2) the political necessity of full employment 
assuming primacy over ideology, and 3) a budding willingness to sacrifice a degree of 
autonomy if the U.S. continued to assist in footing the security bill.139 This did not end 
                                                 
135 Lifshitz, “Security and the National Economy,” in Security Concerns: Insights from the Israeli 
Experience, 318–319; Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 48; Mintz, “The Military-industrial 
Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,” 629. 
136 Ibid., 631, 634; Beinin, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict,” 
115. In his opinion, while former military leaders were spread out across the MIC as managers and CEOs, 
there was no single consensus on policy or significant social cohesion within the group (similar to those 
parachuting into politics). 
137 Lifshitz, “Security and the National Economy,” in Security Concerns: Insights from the Israeli 
Experience, 323.  
138 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 550–552, 555. “The private sector now had an important role because of the 
government’s decision to move away from etatism and toward economic liberalization.” The public sector 
was not seen either as efficient or technologically agile as the private domain. 
139 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security 
Policy, 1967–1977,” 550–552, 556–557; Beinin, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of 
Constant Conflict,” 109. Israel had been teetering on the edge of recession prior to the 1967 war, and the 
astronomical costs associated with the 1973 conflict convinced its leadership that foreign assistance on a 
large scale (while unpalatable ideologically) would be necessary. From 1967 to 1977, external budget 
liabilities increased from 15.4% to 26.5%. U.S. support had been gradually increasing through the 1960s, 
and “after 1971, the U.S. government replaced world Jewry as Israel’s largest donor.”  
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the central planning effort for defense production, as fiscal manipulation would continue 
to funnel funding toward “essential” enterprises, with an eye toward the development of a 
military export market.140  
By the late 1970s, MAPAI/LABOR lost its political hegemony to 
HERUT/LIKUD, partially the result of a lagging economy, skyrocketing inflation and a 
ballooning military budget.141 The new, conservative government undertook an assault 
on previous economic programs, with particular interest paid to the grossly bloated size 
of the public sphere.142 As the Israeli economy teetered on the brink of fiscal meltdown, a 
New Economic Policy (NEP) was instituted in 1985 by a unity government. The goal was 
aimed at: 1) reducing private/public consumption, 2) implementing austerity measures, 3) 
decreasing the size of the public domain (via increased privatization), and 4) seeking 
additional assistance from the U.S.143 The effort was ultimately successful in not only 
stemming the downturn, but incorporating necessary reforms, which allowed the Israeli 
economic system (public and private) to thrive during the 1990s era of globalization. This 




                                                 
140 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 135–136. The military was essentially a 
captive market, given its inherent high demand for technology and equipment. As such, they tended to be 
less concerned about where the support was derived, so long as they were able to achieve the mission.  
141 Beinin, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict,” 124. Inflation 
ultimately hit an annual rate of 445% by 1984. The onset of stagflation was Israel’s “linking its political 
economy, its military establishment, and the dominant political and cultural assumption of indefinitely 
protracted conflict with hostile Arab neighbors.”  
142 Ibid. This effort was only partially successful, as HERUT/LIKUD needed to remain strong on 
defense spending to maintain its political base.  
143 Aharoni, “The Changing Political Economy of Israel,” 138. In this case, economic rationality 
replaced ideological dogma, and signaled the “end of major substantive differences between Labor and the 
Likud on macro-economic policy. Both parties now endorsed a program of privatization, marketization and 
integration into the global economy.” 
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enhanced security and economy efficiency were seen as parallel goals.144 That said, 
while defense budgets have been significantly reduced since the 1980s, they remain the 
single largest government expenditure (see Figure 9145). 
 
Figure 9.   Domestic Defense Spending (% GDP) 
                                                 
144 Guy Ben-Porat and Shlomo Mizrahi, “Political Culture, Alternative Politics and Foreign Policy: 
The Case of Israel,” Policy Sciences 38, no. 2/3 (2005): 184–186. Shimon Peres was a firm believer that 
peace would be an economic win-win for all involved. Ben-Porat concurs, stating that “while the Israeli 
economy has been on the path of liberalization since the mid-1980s the continuation of the conflict was 
perceived as impeding economic progress.” Unfortunately, the two have yet to prove mutually supportive, 
as peace remains elusive. “Despite the economic growth in Israel following the Oslo accords, popular 
support for the peace process remained tepid.” 
145 Sher, “Facets of the Israeli Economy—The Defense Industry,” 75.  
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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THROUGH THE 
FORMATIVE YEARS: THE 1967 WAR AS A TURNING POINT 
As previously noted, a unique set of circumstances have contributed to the 
evolution of a distinctive civil-military relationship whereby the IDF exercises 
disproportionate influence relative to the elected leadership.146 Despite proclamations 
that the Israeli military officially remains subordinate to the country’s elected civilian 
government, the nature of boundaries and cooperation between the two entities remains 
blurry and troubling, particularly since the 1967 War. It was this seminal event, which: 1) 
significantly altered the civil-military dynamic in favor of the latter, 2) ended a period of 
IDF abstention from direct involvement in the political realm, and 3) initiated 20+ years 
of military dominance behind the scenes. 
While this power-sharing has experienced micro-level trend fluctuation based on 
the personalities of its three key position holders (i.e., PM, DEFMIN and CGS), at the 
macro-level, the security establishment has clearly assumed a more assertive role in the 
policy-making process due to politically-oriented factors. According to Udi Lebel, 
Defense policy in Israel has always been considered the most critical 
domain, providing Israelis with their most vital public product: security. 
The tool of security is the army, which has become endowed with a 
religious status….Security receives the lion’s share of the State budget, 
and defense policy is the key component determining the way citizens 
vote.147 
Gone are the days of a military overseen and constrained by the will of a strong civil 
leadership and party system. In its place, divergent views on security, “second careers” in 
                                                 
146 Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,” 
635; Stuart A. Cohen, “The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a “People's Army” to a “Professional 
Military”—Causes and Implications,” Armed Forces & Society 21, no. 2 (1995): 248. According to Charles 
Freilich, since independence, Israel has “confronted an external environment whose primary characteristic 
has been perceived as one of nearly unremitting and overwhelming hostility.” This is echoed by Stuart 
Cohen, who believes the lack of boundaries between the two spheres is a byproduct of the ongoing security 
problem. This has obvious implications for the popular outlook, giving impetus to the military’s role 
expansion out of necessity. 
147 Udi Lebel, “Civil Society versus Military Sovereignty,” Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 1 (2007): 
71. 
 50
government for senior IDF leaders, and military role expansion/contraction have 
permanently altered the power relationship. They injected the IDF into a default role as 
expert and arbiter of issues far beyond simple security. While authors, such as Stuart 
Cohen maintain the Israeli military’s societal role has decreased over the past 20 years 
(see Figure 10148), its overall influence certainly remains prominent by any measure.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Changing Flow Patterns in IDF Dominance/Subordination 
A. KEY PLAYERS OF THE ISRAELI SYSTEM 
When taking into account the Israeli civil-military model, initial focus must be 
placed on the nature and interaction of primary leadership positions within government, 
on both sides of the divide. Notable among these are the PM, DEFMIN, CGS, the 
Cabinet (alternatively referred to as “the government”) and the Knesset (directly elected 




                                                 
148 Cohen, “Changing Civil-military Relations in Israel,” 772–775. Cohen believes “it is now the 
civilian constituents of the Civil-military equation that are able to exploit the ‘fragmented’ boundaries in 
order to intrude upon what were once considered exclusively military spheres.” While the initial flow (from 
the 1960s to 1980s) had been in favor of the IDF, in his opinion, there has been a distinct reversal over the 
past 20 years. The military now finds itself in the position of having to negotiate with society in a much 
more confrontational atmosphere.  
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on a series a “Basic Laws” to define specific rights and responsibilities, the legal 
interrelationship between civilian and military domains (particularly regarding security 
matters) tends to remain ill defined and nebulous.149 
The role of PM, as government head and chief executive of the state, was not 
formally elaborated until 1968’s “Basic Law: The Government.”150 Instead, David Ben-
Gurion established historical precedent as the guiding principle upon the state’s 1948 
founding. While envisioned as a “first among equals” within the Cabinet, Ben-Gurion’s 
presence and personality brought forth the practice of rule via personal determination and 
force of will. That said, there was no specific mention of a legal connection between the 
PM and defense-related issues during the early years, other than that implied in the role 
as head of government. To combat this perceived shortcoming, a number of Israeli PM’s 
took on the additional role of DEFMIN, consolidating both state policy and defense 
leadership in a single individual.151 It was not until 1991 that a permanent, direct security 
role for the PM was established with the formation of a statutory Ministerial Committee 
of National Security.152  
The nature of the DEFMIN’s role has remained a source of significant contention 
and debate within the civil-military community due to the position’s vague definition and 
delineation of responsibility. Established by the 1948 ordinance, which brought the IDF 
into existence, the DEFMIN exists in a de facto netherworld between the two spheres.153 
                                                 
149 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 27–55. 
150 Ibid., 37. 
151 Giora Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” in Communicating 
Security: Civil-military Relations in Israel, ed. Udi Lebel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 21. Goldberg 
anecdotally relates that “five of the seven prime ministers who came from the Labour party served as 
defence ministers at the same time [the exceptions were Moshe Sharett and Golda Meir]…On the other 
hand, none of the four prime ministers who came from the Likud took the position of defence minister.” 
152 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 28–39. According to Ben-Meir, “the basic 
constitutional framework reflects mandatory rule and British traditions, as well as the accumulated 
experience of the democratically organized Zionist movement.” Formulated along the lines of the British 
model, Israeli government functions as a small cabinet environment where the Prime Minister is the first 
among equals, where adhoc precedence is the norm (similar to Europe but very much unlike American 
propensity/desire for established standards). Differing from their British counterparts, Israel’s Prime 
Minister can bring about government termination as a political tool but cannot call for new elections 
unilaterally.  
153 Ibid., 39–42.  
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As government (i.e., Cabinet) representative to the IDF, the occupant is primarily 
considered an actor within the civilian bureaucracy, responsible for budget, acquisition, 
research and development (R&D) and general support. Operational/military matters are 
inherently delegated to senior military commanders in his name. The enduring question 
remains whether the DEFMIN is in effect a “chief of war,” with the authority of a “Super 
CGS,” or merely the administrative link between the politicians and defense 
establishment?154  
The IDF’s CGS, as head of the armed forces, was first mentioned in the Military 
Jurisdiction Law of 1955. Similar to the PM and DEFMIN, his role has also remained ill-
defined, with leadership responsibilities and influence principally a function of custom 
and tradition as the armed forces’ senior-ranking officer. The CGS’s legal status was not 
formally defined until 1976, with the passage of “Basic Law: The Army.”155 Due to the 
nature of his responsibility to the government for operational security matters, the CGS 
blurs the political-military boundaries by functioning as a quasi minister.156 This has 
obvious and relevant implications for the relationship dynamic with the DEFMIN, his 
nominal superior. 
The Israeli Cabinet/Government, a small group of senior ministers, functions in 
principal as collective commander-in-chief (CINC) of the armed forces. While there is no 
direct, formal relationship between this body and the security establishment, the broadly 
interpreted nature of the “The Basic Law: Government” extends to the central 
government all executive authority not specified elsewhere (by default). As the 
Provisional Government established both the state and the military in May 1948, it is, 
therefore, inferred that the elected leadership has an indirect link to the security apparatus 
                                                 
154 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 39–41. The issue was directly addressed in the 
aftermath of the 1973 War by the Agranat Commission, which determined that “the lack of a definition of 
the powers existing in the present situation in the area of defense…makes effective action difficult, blurs 
the focus of legal responsibility, and even creates lack of clarity and confusion amongst the general public.” 
155 Ibid., 31, 35, 41–42, 45, 56, 67; Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 365–
367. This ordinance stipulated, “the supreme command level in the army is the chief of the general staff.” 
156 Ibid., 43. Unlike other Israeli deputy ministers and directors general, the CGS has a dual 
responsibility of reporting to both his superior (the DEFMIN) and the government (i.e., the cabinet and 
PM). According to former PM and DEFMIN Shimon Peres, the CGS is therefore “three-quarters military 
and one-quarter-political.” 
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via the DEFMIN. Despite this notional subordination, there has been little in the way of a 
direct control mechanism to oversee defense issues. The Ministerial Defense Committee 
(MDC) has perennially suffered from haphazard incorporation and a lack of 
institutionalized authority, with formal constitutional standing only conferred as recently 
as 1991.157  
The Knesset (popularly elected Legislative Assembly) has even less direct control 
or influence over security issues. The majority of power within Israel’s political system 
resides within the executive branch (the cabinet/government), and there are few 
checks/balances designed to assure an even distribution of power. Israeli legislators do 
have three specific tools at their disposal, which can be used as a means of redress, to 
include: 1) legislative ability, 2) budget control (i.e., “power of the purse”), and 3) the 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FADC). History has demonstrated that the first 
two are rarely utilized, as the mantra of “national security” consistently serves as a self-
censorship function, while the third has little specific influence outside of advisory 
channels.158  
B. THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1948–1967) 
As noted, the Jewish State was born into intractable hostility between two 
nationalist groups (Zionists and Palestinians, the latter supported by surrounding Arabs) 
who had been in conflict with one another for well over 50 years. As a result of avowed 
Arab rejection of any partition of Mandatory Palestine, coupled with ongoing 
conventional and asymmetric threats, the Israeli public’s perception rapidly developed an 
                                                 
157 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 29–32. The MDC has traditionally had little authority 
with which to rein in the military, as it varied in size, scope and importance based on the nature of a given 
administration. Ben-Gurion never put much stake in the organization’s relevance and, while Levi Eshkol 
increased its responsibilities, several later Prime Ministers (Shamir, in particular) never bothered even 
convening the group. 
158 Ibid., 44–51; Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and 
Strengths,” 641. The FADC was initially downplayed by Ben-Gurion, and traditionally has had little 
authority beyond 1) consultation and 2) being used by the executive to inform the opposition party of 
military action to be undertaken (typically after the fact). While the incorporation of numerous “permanent 
subcommittees” over the years has led to increased exposure for the FADC, in reality, it continues to 
remain a passive organization hampered by a complete reliance on security-related information from the 
IDF itself.  
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engrained focus/reliance on defense and security. Quantitatively inferior to its Arab 
neighbors, Israel’s civil and military leaderships were confronted with the twin dilemmas 
of, 1) how to mobilize scarce manpower and resources most effectively and 2) how to 
integrate the rapid influx of immigrants into a cohesive society? The result was a unique 
blending of state, security apparatus and society, converting potential weakness into a 
force multiplier. 
The development of the IDF thus blurred the lines between military and society 
by relying on a mass-based, civilianized structure to compensate for an inherent 
numerical disadvantage.159 The Israeli armed forces came to rely on a tiered division of 
labor and responsibility split between: 1) a small, professional component, 2) an active 
force comprised of young conscripts, and 3) a reserve force, which could be quickly 
mobilized in the event of a national emergency. It was, therefore, the goal of the active 
component (both professionals and conscripts) to hold an enemy at bay until the much 
larger reserve element could be brought to bear as an augmenting force.160 This model  
 
 
                                                 
159 Bartov, 27–33. While this may have been unusual from an American perspective, it was quite 
unremarkable from the European experience. The Nation in arms concept had been pioneered by the 
French in 1793 and was common throughout the continent prior to 1945 (having been perfected by the 
Prussians/Germans).  
160 Uri Ben-Eliezer, “From Military Role-Expansion to Difficulties in Peace-Making: The Israel 
Defense Forces 50 Years On,” in Military, State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspective, ed. Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek (New Brunswick: Transition Publishers, 
2001): 146–147; Uri Ben-Eliezer, “Rethinking the Civil-military Relations Paradigm: The Inverse Relation 
Between Militarism and Praetorianism through the Example of Israel,” Comparative Political Studies 30, 
no. 3 (1997): 362; Dan Horowitz, “The Israeli Concept of National Security,” in National Security and 
Democracy in Israel, ed. Avner Yaniv (London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1993): 15–16; Cohen, From a 
“People's Army” to a “Professional Military,” 237–240; Ze’ev Schiff, “Fifty Years of Israeli Security: The 
Central Role of the Defense System.” Middle East Journal 53, no. 3, Special Issue on Israel (1999): 434; 
Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, “Civil-military Relations in Israel at the Outset of the Twenty-First 
Century,” in Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns, ed. Uzi Rebhun and Chaim 
Waxman, 2nd ed. (Hannover and London: Brandeis University Press, 2003): 334–336; Dan Horowitz, 
“Israel's War in Lebanon: New Patterns of Strategic Thinking and Civil-military Relations,” in Israeli 
Society and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, 
ed. Moshe Lissak (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1984): 87. Once an individual completed active 
service, a reserve requirement was fulfilled via one month of mobilization per year until “retirement age” 
(initially 54, later reduced to 45). This provided the necessary force structure to complement the active 
component when necessary, but also had a significant influence on the unique ties between Israeli society 
and the IDF. According to Dan Horowitz, “The soldier is called a ‘civilian in uniform’ while the civilian is 
considered a ‘soldier on eleven-month annual furlough’.” 
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proved highly successful in Israel’s early years as conflicts were typically of short 
duration and the IDF maintained a significant qualitative advantage over neighboring 
Arab foes. 
The armed forces’ responsibilities transcended purely military objectives, 
reaching across into the societal sphere as a function of its “role expansion” in the early 
years.161 According to Uri Ben-Eliezer and Stuart Cohen, the IDF was seen as a de facto 
melting pot, “an instrument of modern Jewish ‘nation-building’.”162 It was also 
responsible for such diverse tasks as: 1) the education of both immigrants and 
underprivileged Israelis, 2) construction of critical infrastructure projects, 3) providing 
medical care to segments of the population, and 4) enriching civil culture via 
entertainment, news and radio.  
The foundation, and most important aspect, of this new system was the 
universally accepted notion regarding civilian control over the military. While security 
needs took precedence over foreign and domestic policy, Ben-Gurion was determined to 
remove any/all privatization and factionalism from the IDF to mitigate its potential 
emergence as a political rival.163 The military’s subordination was, therefore, rigorously 
overseen by a framework of state-level institutions, and would remain firmly under the 
                                                 
161 Ben-Eliezer, “From Military Role-Expansion to Difficulties in Peace-Making,” 138–141; Cohen, 
“From a ‘People's Army’ to a ‘Professional Military’,” 237–250; Cohen, “Changing Civil-military 
Relations in Israel,” 246–247. Ben-Eliezer and Cohen diverge on whether this connection is a positive 
aspect of the Israeli system. The former, taking a negative perspective, argues, “the differentiation between 
soldier and civilian is seriously weakened.” Cohen, on the other hand, believes the process has been 
positive and laments what he sees as a “role contraction” over the past 20 years.  
162 Ben-Eliezer, “From Military Role-Expansion to Difficulties in Peace-Making,” 138–141; Cohen, 
“From a ‘People's Army’ to a ‘Professional Military’,” 237–250. According to Cohen, the recent move 
toward professionalism “will prejudice the military’s traditional role as Israel’s primary ‘melting pot’.” 
163 Yoram Peri, “Party-Military Relations in a Pluralist System,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense 
Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, ed. Moshe Lissak 
(London: Frank Cass and Company, 1984): 47. According to Peri, fear of military ascendancy went back to 
the Yishuv days. “The relations between the military and the party were…similar to the relationship of the 
party with other political and administrative structures: subordination, acquiescence. The military appeared 
to party leaders a potential challenger that must be contained, manipulated and controlled at all times in 
order to prevent a serious threat to the party monopoly of power.” 
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PM’s (i.e., his) control.164 According to Uri Ben-Eliezer, “a kind of trade-off took place 
between the political and military elites. The latter obeyed the political leadership and 
discarded any possible threat to its rule, whereas the politicians gave the young people 
the freedom to operate according to their own lights.”165  
Ben-Gurion’s modus operandi was to exercise a highly dominant, personal rule 
over the civil-military process (and government, in general). He strictly controlled senior 
IDF appointments in Israel’s early days, even down to levels below flag rank. This 
enabled to him to maintain patronage among party loyalists and protégés, while weeding 
out those perceived as a potential political threats.166 Ben-Gurion also sought to limit any 
semblance of checks on the government’s (i.e., HIS) authority to conduct security related 
policy. This included: 1) an informal decision making process whereby the PM had both 
extreme flexibility and few limitations,167 2) a severely curtailed role for the Knesset’s 
FADC, which was seen purely as an information provider,168 3) limiting the functional 
                                                 
164 Peri, “Party-Military Relations in a Pluralist System,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense 
Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, 51; Heper and Itzkowitz-
Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 232; Zev Schiff, “Fifty Years of Israeli 
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165 Ben-Eliezer, “Rethinking the Civil-military Relations Paradigm,” 362; Peri, “Party-Military 
Relations in a Pluralist System,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political 
Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, 47. Peri’s assessment, describing a “complementary elite,” concurs 
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harmonious relations between the two generations and to the subordination of the military organization to 
the political institutions.” 
166 Peri, “Party-Military Relations in a Pluralist System,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense 
Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, 51–53; Charles D. Smith, 
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St Martin's, 2007): 280. During the 
Yishuv period, rival political parties within the Zionist socialist spectrum each had their own political 
militia. Following the 1948 war, these were phased out in favor of a unitary (and depoliticized) armed 
force, inherently wedded to the dominant MAPAI party structure. Leaders associated with HERUT 
(revisionist/extreme right) and MAPAM (communist-leaning/extreme left), in spite of military 
accomplishments, were typically denied promotion to senior levels in the IDF based on the prerogative of 
Ben-Gurion himself. A case in point was Yigal Allon, who was passed over for the CGS position in favor 
of MAPAI protégé Moshe Dayan. 
167 Yehuda Ben-Meir, National Security Decisionmaking : The Israeli Case (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1986), 100. According to Ben-Meir, Ben-Gurion was an advocate of “constructive ambiguity.” 
168 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 48–49. “The views of its members were listened to, 
but they had little if any effect on Ben-Gurion.” 
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authority of the MDC,169 and 4) a separation of the IDF from extraneous support 
functions, which were summarily transferred to the MOD. The latter aspect was imposed 
to allow the armed forces to concentrate solely on martial pursuits, and “to free the 
military from activities that corrupt the moral character of its members.” Ben-Gurion’s 
mistakenly relied too much on his own personal control and did not formalize this 
structural interrelationship with a legal standing; as the IDF (over time) gradually 
encroached on areas of civilian functional responsibility (to include procurement and 
arms exports).170  
Ben-Gurion’s policies and approaches can be interpreted as the pragmatic, centrist 
position within the Israeli political spectrum, as he remained moderate relative to the 
fringe positions.171 Additionally, while elevating the IDF on a pedestal as the key 
element within Israeli society, Ben-Gurion was not afraid to stand up to its leadership 
when issues of policy primacy came into question. Against CGS Dayan’s wishes, he 
followed through with the required pullout from the Sinai Desert in 1957, and refused to 
allow senior IDF members to attend or participate in cabinet meetings during the early 
                                                 
169 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 31; Ben-Meir, National Security Decisionmaking: The 
Israeli Case, 103. While the MDC’s establishment was a concession to junior coalition partners, and was 
meant to have a measure of influence within security-related decision making, in reality, Ben-Gurion 
monopolized overall control via his position as both PM and DEFMIN.  
170 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 88. “According to these guidelines, the IDF would 
deal with the fighting and preparations for war—i.e., all matters relating to military operations…from 
strategic to tactical – whereas the MOD would be responsible for the entire fiscal and support system.” This 
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front. If a CGS could play the two leaders against each other (which they often did), it allowed for 1) a 
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171 Heller, “Israel's Dilemmas,” 22. While typically portrayed as an ardent Zionist bent on wholesale 
expansion, Ben-Gurion actually fell between Sharett’s left-leaning/accommodationist position and Begin’s 
goal of creating a “Greater Israel.” 
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state period.172 This stance reinforced military subordination to him and, according to 
Joshua Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “brought about the IDF’s respect for civilian authority.”173  
The most notable military figure during the Ben-Gurion era was Moshe Dayan, 
CGS from1953–1958. He was of a newer generation of native-born Israeli leaders, and 
was deemed “independent-minded and insubordinate by nature.”174 Dayan was a close 
personal friend and protégé of Ben-Gurion, and considered both a political activist within 
the Mapai party and an expansionist regarding Israel’s borders. By extension, his 
appointment to the head of the armed forces could be expected to lead to a politicization 
of IDF senior leadership.175 He would remain influential over the next three decades, 
occupying a number of strategic offices, to include DEFMIN (1967–1974) and Foreign 
Minister (1977–1979). While his party affiliation changed periodically based on political 
expediency, his strategic views remained consistent with those articulated by Ben-
Gurion. 
The first crack in the civil-military facade came with the “Lavon Affair” of 1954. 
It demonstrated that the relationship between the three key stakeholders (PM, DEFMIN, 
and CGS) remained subject to personal and political considerations. In this case, recently 
ascended DEFMIN Pinchas Lavon, was determined to exercise increased/direct 
                                                 
172 Zev Schiff, “Fifty Years of Israeli Security: The Central Role of the Defense System,” 436; Peri, 
“Party-Military Relations in a Pluralist System,” 51. The latter ultimately changed, post 1967, as the CGS, 
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and other senior officers became fixtures at government 
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173 Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” 18; Heper 
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174 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
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175 Ibid., 100–101. Ben-Eliezer, “Rethinking the Civil-military Relations Paradigm,” 363. According 
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operational control over the IDF.176 This resulted in friction between Lavon, and 1) 
Moshe Sharett (Ben-Gurion’s short-lived successor as PM) and 2) CGS Dayan. 
Following fall-out from the 1954 exposure of a covert Israeli spy ring operating in Egypt 
(unbeknownst to the DEFMIN), senior IDF leaders closed ranks in opposition to Lavon, 
laying the blame for the fiasco squarely at his feet.177 Sharett convened an inquiry to 
ascertain blame regarding the operation’s initiation but, despite inconclusive findings, 
Lavon remained tainted by the affair and resigned.178 Upon Ben-Gurion’s return to office 
as both PM and DEFMIN in 1955, it became clear that his principle concern was to 
absolve and protect the military (by extension, Dayan and Shimon Peres) from any 
culpability in this failure. It was not until 1960 that the magnitude of the fiasco became 
public, with allegations of perjury leveled at senior members of the IDF.179  
By the mid-1960s, Ben-Gurion had retired from political life for good, with the 
party/government reins passed to his successor, Levi Eshkol. While Eshkol had assisted 
his predecessor in “subjugating the military leadership” under civilian control, he himself 
had no security background upon which to draw legitimacy in the eyes of the defense 
                                                 
176 Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, 98–99, 105, 108; Smith, Palestine and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 241. Shlaim takes the position that Lavon had been a poor choice for DEFMIN due 
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177 Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 232; Smith, 
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establishment.180 Continuing Ben-Gurion’s practice of combining both PM and DEFMIN 
portfolios, he did maintain a cordial working relationship with CGS Yitzhak Rabin, who 
was given great latitude and de facto autonomy.181 So long as policy agreement existed 
with the security sector, there was a measure of stability between the two spheres. 
Unfortunately, Eshkol’s attempts to reform the civil-military system occurred 
simultaneously with MAPAI party infighting and fragmentation, which painted him as 
weak on defense issues.182 This had a detrimental effect on his relations with the military 
and, coupled with increasing tensions between Israel and its neighbors, reached critical 
mass in May 1967. 
Just prior to the June 1967 War, during a period to be known as the “General’s 
Revolt,” PM Eshkol’s caution, perceived indecisiveness, and apparent flip-flopping on 
strategic policy, led to a severe backlash from IDF leaders.183 The generals demanded 
swift action to catch the Arab states off-guard, and a “feeling of rebellion was in the 
air.”184 Eshkol remained firm in his position that “the political echelon will make the 
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184 Ibid., 36, 38, 40–41; Ben-Eliezer, “Rethinking the Civil-military Relations Paradigm,” 367. It was 
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decisions and the military commanders must obey, whether they like it or not.”185 There 
was never any concern that IDF leaders would ultimately disobey the elected 
government; rather, “Israeli generals were deeply involved in politics because of a 
sincere belief that ‘everything was being ruined’…which endangered the very existence 
of Israel.”186 Ultimately, the IDF inadvertently became an actor in the political process as 
Eshkol was forced to relinquish the DEFMIN portfolio to Moshe Dayan, ending the 
stand-off but inadvertently hastening the upcoming conflict.187 
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V. A PERIOD OF CHANGE: 1967–1992 
The 1967 War became, in effect, the watershed point for civil-military relations in 
Israel. Whereas strong civilian leadership had traditionally been sufficient as a 
counterbalance to the IDF’s growing popularity and influence, the conflict unleashed an 
entirely new set of variables, which permanently altered the relationship dynamic. 
Probably the most important/least recognized was the separation of PM and DEFMIN 
portfolios prior to the war, which allowed for policy and coordination ambiguity. 
Additionally relevant were: 1) an end of consensus on national security policy, 2) the 
deterioration of political stability and single-party dominance, 3) weakening of a formerly 
strong civil-military relationship, and 4) the transformation of the IDF into a vehicle for 
political mobility.188 Cumulatively, these had a tremendous effect by enabling the 
security establishment (intentionally or otherwise) to become more influential in policy 
making relative to the civilian leadership. 
A. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES  
Eshkol’s acquiescence in appointing Dayan as DEFMIN set a precedent by 
splitting leadership of the key spheres among two individuals. Whereas Ben-Gurion had 
historically maintained the reins of both during his tenure (the Sharett years were an 
outlier), this fundamental alteration enabled the military establishment to manipulate one 
actor against another in its own (perceived) best interests. Unfortunately, attempts to 
define the new PM-DEFMIN connection were half-hearted, ultimately based more on the 
nature of personal relationships than legal standing. While it behooved both offices to 
work closely as a means of aligning policy and mitigating IDF influence, these efforts 
were typically hit or miss in their effectiveness. Yehuda Ben-Meir provides numerous 
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examples where the bond between the two was akin to partners (Rabin/Peres during 
1970s, Begin’s early support of his DEFMIN’s, etc.), and others where clashes between 
the two were more prevalent (Sharett/Lavon and Begin/Sharon).189 It was these latter 
instances when the security establishment was able to cement inroads into strategic policy 
making.  
The 1967 victory also terminated nearly 20 years of consensus on national 
security policy, inadvertently encouraging the security establishment to weigh in as 
expert on one position or the other. Arye Naor demonstrates the unintended contradiction 
between sweeping tactical victory and eventual strategic failure, pointing out the lack of a 
civilian planning and support staff ultimately hampered the government’s ability to resist 
IDF calls to push further.190 He also points out that periods of Dayan’s waffling (as 
DEFMIN) during the conflict allowed the military to expand their objectives beyond 
initial goals. This resulted in both an increased opportunity cost (in terms of occupation-
related expenditures), and a split in public/policy opinion regarding the Occupied 
Territories.191 This divergence was a function of the 1967 war, accelerated with the 1973 
and 1982 wars, and remains a key factor even to the present. 
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The conflict’s aftermath also saw the end of single party stability and dominance, 
as well as political supremacy over the military. MAPAI/LABOR gradually lost 
hegemonic control of the state/political system, increasingly relying on the good graces 
of appointees within the security apparatus to support its policies. With the IDF’s status 
greatly elevated following its recent wartime success, interaction between the two spheres 
became akin to partnership vice superior/subordinate. According to Stuart Cohen, “for 
some two decades after the mid-1960s, the relationship of the leading figures in Israel’s 
political, economic and judicial establishments toward the IDF was basically one of 
symbiosis.”192 In this environment, the defense establishment became tainted by 
partisanship as it “found itself dragged into internal political disputes within Israel,” with 
rival parties vying to “recruit” senior military officers to their positions.193 No longer 
were the armed forces a neutral bystander in the policy-making process, by supporting 
specific elements within the system they became “the political echelon’s partner or 
antagonist, rather than its instrument.”194 Within 10 years, the fundamental nature of the 
political landscape would be altered as Likud (the longtime opposition party) would win 
national elections, propelling Menachem Begin to the Premiership.  
Finally, military service became a vehicle/avenue for political mobility, as senior 
officers began to transition (“parachute”) into second careers in the political domain.195 
By the late 1950s/early 1960s, the first generation of IDF leaders were entering the 
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twilight of their service, due to the relatively short duration of military careers.196 All had 
spent their formative years in military service and, molded by the mutual experience, this 
contributed to a natural bridge/ similarity of perspective between the two spheres.197 
While there is some concern that actively serving officers are co-opted in advance by the 
political process, with the parties “enlisting” those of similar mindset and policy 
predilection, the practice is simply not looked down upon by Israelis.198 In fact, three 
senior IDF leaders went on to become PM’s (Rabin, Barak and Sharon), while eight rose 
to DEFMIN (Dayan, Weizman, Rabin, Sharon, Mordechai, Ben-Eliezer, Mofaz and 
Barak). On the whole, parachuting led to a rapid increase in the number of military 
officers participating in the government throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but the 
percentage has leveled off and remained stable since that point (see Figure 11199). 
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199 Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” 17–19. 
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Figure 11.   Former Senior IDF Leadership as a Percentage of Government Ministers 
While the worldwide phenomenon of former military leaders moving into 
government service is not uncommon, the proportional rate of accession in Israel would 
(on the surface) appear unusual. It presents the impression that there is an inherent civil-
military connection, through which politics is a logical progression of military service. In 
reality, there needs to be a differentiation between civilian leaders who have fulfilled 
minimum service obligations (i.e., the result of standard conscription) and those who 
have extended years of experience serving in senior positions of military responsibility. 
Additionally, the claim of Israeli militarization and collusion between the spheres (on the 
whole) is likely overblown, as senior officers entering the political domain are rarely of a 
single mindset (little different from their military service) or desire to monopolize the 
system.200 
Throughout the 1970s, Israel struggled to come to terms with the rising influence 
of its armed forces, particularly in the aftermath of the deeply troubling 1973 War. While 
                                                 
200 Lissak, “The Unique Approach to Military-societal Relations in Israel,” 249. Lissak goes to great 
lengths to refute claims of endemic militarism within Israeli society, and the IDF, in particular. His 
argument centers on the issue of pluralism within IDF leadership, during and post-service. He posits that 
“IDF General Staff and Senior officers rarely formulate a unified position on any substantive military-
strategic issue,” and “retired officers who go into politics are found at almost every shade of the spectrum.” 
 68
senior IDF leaders expanded their role into diplomatic venues during the disengagement 
and peace processes, serious flaws in the system were observed and publicized.201 The 
1973–74 Agranat Commission noted glaring deficiencies in civil-military delineation and 
superior/subordinate relationships, calling for an expanded effort to remove ambiguity 
between the spheres.202 It was not 1976’s passage of “Basic Law: The Army” that an 
attempt was made to provide legal foundation for such improvements.203 According to 
Amir Bar-Or and Yehuda Ben-Meir, respectively, the legislation “intended to define 
formally and explicitly Israel’s political-military relations,” and “firmly established 
constitutional principle of civilian control over the military.”204 While successful at a 
macro level, the effort intentionally avoided many complex issues, ultimately failing to 
correct significant deficiencies. Notably, while re-affirming civil authority, it neglected to 
define key roles and relationships, leaving the primary actors (PM, DEFMIN, and CGS) 
with sufficient “wiggle room” to avoid any distinct loss of influence. Additionally, the 
issue of politics was sidestepped, “deliberately formulated to allow a high degree of 
military involvement…without either endorsing or preventing it.”205 It was not until 
1979’s Military Justice Law that the CGS’s carte blanche authority for unilateral action 
was rescinded, requiring future approval from the DEFMIN himself. 
                                                 
201 Ben-Dor and Pedahzur, “Civil-military Relations in Israel at the Outset of the Twenty-First 
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203 Ben-Meir, Civil-military Relations in Israel, 31, 35, 41–42, 45, 56, 67; Heper and Itzkowitz-
Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 235–236; Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations 
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204 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 365–366; Ben-Meir, Civil-military 
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205 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 366; Peri, “Political-military 
Partnership in Israel,” 311.  
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A further compounding of the situation occurred in 1977, with Likud’s 
momentous wresting of political hegemony away from the long faltering 
MAPAI/LABOR coalition.206 While demonstrating the successful transition of 
democratic power, the effect on national security issues was substantial. In essence, it, 1) 
completed the fragmentation of strategic consensus, which had begun in 1967 and 2) 
further tinged the IDF as a political player. Dan Horowitz opines, “dependence of 
strategic decisions on politics and ideology undermined the autonomous standing of the 
defense establishment, which in the past had been able to formulate security doctrines 
and policies acceptable to holders of disparate and even opposing political views.”207 
Even more challenging, Likud leadership was unable to appoint like-minded officers 
within the senior IDF hierarchy, as the preponderance of candidates owed their allegiance 
and positions to the time-honored tradition of Labor party patronage.208 This had clear 
implications on civil-military relations, as PM Begin was confronted with a defense 
establishment who initially saw security-related issues from a different perspective than 
his own. 
No one symbolized the changing civil-military dynamic more than Begin himself. 
As an anachronistic throwback to the days of Ben-Gurion’s cult of power politics, the 
new PM led by gut instinct and left little room for divergence of opinion or purpose. 
Begin had always been an opposition leader, and while lacking in formal military 
experience, he was wise enough to surround himself with subject matter experts.209 There 
was a stubborn willingness to stand up to the military or the government on strategic 
                                                 
206 Ben-Meir, National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case, 111. This was known as “the 
turnabout” (mahapach), and “resulted in the most dramatic change in the political scene since the creation 
of the state.” 
207 Horowitz, “The Israeli Concept of National Security,” 30.  
208 Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “Civil-military Relations in Israel and Turkey,” 236. According to 
Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “the military‘s top echelons did not share the political views of the civilian 
leadership—which was often the case during the Likud governments in 1977–1992.” That said, at no point 
was the specter of a military rebellion present, as officers accepted their responsibility to the security of the 
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209 Ben-Meir, National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case, 111–115; Inbar, “Israeli National 
Security, 1973–96,” 64–65. Begin’s experience in the Irgun (a paramilitary/terrorist group) is well 
documented. After coming to power during the 1977 elections, he initially chose former military leaders 
Chaim Weizman, Moshe Dayan, and (later) Ariel Sharon to guide his policies.  
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issues, as Begin dismissed various attempts to sidetrack the Camp David process.210 Over 
time, Dayan and Weizman (moderate holdovers from the Labor days) would clash with 
him on policy and depart the administration, leaving new DEFMIN Ariel Sharon with 
increasing influence and power. This transformation, coupled with an extremely activist 
CGS (in the person of Rafael Eitan), contributed to the 1982 Israeli fiasco in Lebanon.211 
By the 1980s, the IDF had begun to experience a decline in status at several 
levels. A growing antagonism between the military and society, coupled with a spate of 
overzealous DEFMINs, certainly played a part in this trend. That said, it was the move 
away from the earlier concept of “ein brera” (no choice), which left the most notable 
impact on civil-military relations.212 Rather than engaging in conflicts, which sought to 
assure the nation’s very survival, a function of maintaining status quo stability, the new 
generation of military actions were considered “wars of choice.” In the case of Lebanon, 
PM Begin justified incursion “in order to avoid a costlier, more terrible war in the 
future.”213 This mindset not only terminated long-standing strategic doctrine, but resulted 
in greater autonomy for the military establishment, who were now able to drive policy 
based purely on force application. According to Horwitz, “the ‘partnership’ between the 
                                                 
210 Peri, “Party-military Relations in a Pluralist System,” 50–51. Begin’s dichotic approach could be 
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military and civilian systems was replaced with manipulation of the civilian system by 
the defense establishment, exploiting the latter’s professional authority to dictate policies 
to the government.”214  
With the onset of 1987’s Palestinian popular uprising (the “First Intifada”), the 
IDF continued its divergent relationship with civilian leadership, resulting in a period of 
finger-pointing and blame reminiscent of the post-1973 era. Civilian policymakers, 
particularly DEFMIN Rabin, sought to utilize the IDF to “break the bones” of 
demonstrators to eradicate the movement via brute force. Senior military leadership 
(under CGS Dan Shomron) came to the early realization that such actions would entail 
crossing a moral line, which violated western norms. The CGS openly broke with civil 
policy established by the PM and DEFMIN, making his apprehensions publically known. 
The government hence laid the blame for an inability to quash the rebellion squarely on 
the shoulders of the defense establishment, while Shomron argued that proscribed 
directives were not consistent with realities on the ground.215 This reflected the growing 
divide in Israeli society on the question of the Territories, and further reinforced the vital 
nature of military cooperation in security policy determination. Yoram Peri states, “the 
IDF…situated itself on the left within the new political discourse that arose in the wake 
of the intifada.”216 This greatly influenced a new willingness to consider peace as an 
opportunity to achieve manageable security, playing a behind-the-scenes role within the 
Oslo process. 
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VI. POST-OSLO: THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF POLITICS, 
PERSONALITIES AND THE PEACE PROCESS 
With the end of the Cold War, a new geopolitical paradigm emerged for Israel, 
significantly impacting its civil-military relations and policy making. After 40+ years of 
unremitting conflict, senior IDF leadership experienced a shift in the balance of judgment 
regarding the feasibility of a permanent peace deal with their Arab neighbors. This could 
be attributed to a confluence of opportunistic circumstances, to include: 1) lessons 
learned from the 1st Intifada, 2) the Soviet Union’s demise, and 3) the defeat of Iraq in 
Operation DESERT STORM.217 Israel’s evolving strategic position thus brought into 
focus relations between the nation’s political and military spheres, with particular 
attention paid to both the peace process and interaction within the strategic triumvirate of 
PM, DEFMIN and CGS. Surprisingly, the latter acted as a de facto driving force behind 
the push for peace and normalization with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
This is certainly in line with perceptions that the armed forces continued to dominate and 
influence the overall nature of Israel’s strategic partnership.  
The ongoing government-military volatility continued as a function of the 
relationship imbalance and permeability between the two spheres (in favor of the IDF). 
While periodic power struggles have sought to restore the elected government’s 
hierarchical control over the military, “the ability of the IDF to influence government 
policy has reflected an Israeli acceptance of a civil-military structure that,” in the 
judgment of some observers, has “assigned undue influence to the IDF’s policy demands 
relative to those of other branches of government.”218 As such, political deference to the 
military has crystallized into an enduring hallmark of the Israeli system, with little sign of 
change evident over the short-medium term.  
                                                 
217 Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 325–326, 329–333; Peri, The Israeli Military and Israel’s 
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A. OSLO AND THE HOPES FOR PEACE (1992–1996)  
The magnitude and duration of 1987’s Intifada came as a significant surprise to 
Israeli leadership (civilian and military), further cementing the doctrinal shift from “war 
between states” to “war between nations.”219 It perpetuated (and deepened) the armed 
forces’ primacy in civil administration and military control of the Occupied Territories, 
demonstrating that conventional force application is not necessarily effective in quelling 
popular uprisings having no singular, defined infrastructure. Concurrently, images of 
heavily armed troops confronting rock-throwing protestors negatively affected both 
political and security reality; ultimately, shifting the IDF’s outlook and position firmly 
into the peace camp.220  
The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union also impacted the process by 
extinguishing material support to the Arab States; thereby, removing potential Syrian 
aggression from the threat equation. As former enemies became conventionally impotent, 
and the Soviets no longer provided external incitement/interference, Israel was now able 
to turn its attention away from purely “traditional” sources of danger. Territorial 
acquisition, therefore, lost its inherent value as a bargaining chip, with the destruction of 
military equipment (no longer replaceable) now ascending in importance.221  
Finally, the issue of Iraqi SCUD attacks prompted dissention over how to address 
the issue of long-range threats in the hands of distant enemies while simultaneously 
assuaging U.S.’ coalition-related concerns. While there were calls for direct response 
within certain elements of the IDF’s leadership, cooler heads prevailed on the issue of 
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restraint.222 The ultimate defeat of Saddam Hussein’s military, coupled with a dramatic 
shift in Syria’s geopolitical position (joining the coalition against Iraq),223 demonstrated 
that an analytical rethinking of strategic depth was required. Peri states, “these changes in 
Israel’s circumstances opened the window of opportunity for a diplomatic accord,” and 
that “in order to enhance preparedness for a possible confrontation with ‘second circle’ 
states, Israel would need to reach a political accommodation with it ‘first circle’ 
neighbours, even at the cost of territorial assets.”224  
Coming on the heels of the ineffective Madrid Conference, the existence of a 
secretive Oslo process itself was initially withheld from the IDF’s leadership.225 Yitzchak 
Rabin (PM and DEFMIN) tended to keep his cards very close-hold, a function of: 1) 
inherent leaks within Israeli bureaucracy, 2) a desire to avoid being forced into a specific 
bargaining position (by the Palestinians), and 3) a fear of potential political and public 
backlash should the process ultimately fail. This was compounded by intransigence on 
the part of CGS Barak, who was adamantly opposed to direct negotiations with the 
Palestinians (a traditional Israeli political-military divergence). Barak’s concerns were 
based on two specific criteria, 1) a belief that the proposed agreement held simply too 
many security loopholes and that 2) peace initiatives with Syria offered far more strategic 
benefit to Israel.226 That said, once a deal had been reached with the PLO, the IDF 
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became deeply involved in the political aspects of negotiation, planning and 
implementation of the agreement over the remainder of the decade. This was a function 
of the organization’s inherent capability to conduct both intelligence 
gathering/assessment and strategic policy formulation, both of which were virtually non-
existent in the government domain.227 
As noted, IDF leadership gradually came to accept the nature of the new 
geopolitical environment over time, pushing for peace as a means to an end (i.e., 
security). This change of heart was certainly not a function of altruism toward the 
Palestinians, but resulted from a narrow, realistic perspective, which “views peace not as 
a primary goal, but first and foremost as a means of attaining security.”228 Alternatively 
stated, “the willingness of Israel’s political-military leadership to grant the Palestinian 
leadership territorial and political benefits arose out of an expectation that in exchange 
Israel would be more secure.”229 Over time, the failure of the Oslo process can, in part, 
be attributed to the self-fulfilling and cyclical nature of this approach (coupled with 
changes in both leadership perspective and personalities). 
B. DISHARMONY WITH BIBI (1996–1999) 
By 1996, the peace process had lurched to a halt in the wake of Yitzchak Rabin’s 
assassination, coupled with Shimon Peres’ inability to address the deteriorating security 
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situation adequately.230 Binyamin Netanyahu subsequently rode a right-wing national 
security plank into office as PM, determined to both kill off Oslo implementation and 
reform, which he saw as excessive military influence in the political sphere.231 
Netanyahu long had a critical attitude toward IDF leadership due to a (not unfounded) 
perception of its inordinate influence in the political and policy-making domain, as well 
as ongoing support of the peace process.232 He was also openly displeased with the IDF’s 
record on quelling violence and its poor recent operational results, going so far as to 
associate the entire military sphere with the opposition LABOR party.233 It was his belief 
that the military should remain focused on training for conflict, and remove itself from 
political activity and policy influence.  
Netanyahu’s goal, therefore, was to reform the nebulous relationship between the 
nation’s security triad, expanding the role of civilian government at the military’s 
expense. He shunted aside military leadership as often as possible, while seeking to 
create a more “civilianized” national security apparatus under his own control (by 
resurrecting the National Security Council concept). While somewhat effective in cutting 
the IDF out of legislative consultation and influence, the overall initiative was ultimately 
watered down, serving mainly to exacerbate tensions between the two spheres (with little 
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tangible result).234 Military leadership chaffed under an operating environment where 
they were forced to interpret nebulous (oft-contradictory) policies, in whose formulation 
they were typically neither included nor consulted.235 Over time, it became clear that the 
new arrangement was simply not viable, as Israel’s civilian government lacked the 
capacity to produce a level of staff work and policy planning comparable with the 
military establishment; forcing Netanyahu to relent.236 As the administration increasingly 
relied on political vilification of the IDF for the failed implementation of poorly 
conceived policies, the stage was set for an eventual showdown between the Prime 
Minister and CGS.237  
At the center of this melee was GCS Ammon Lipkin-Shahak, a popular figure, 
protégé of Yitzchak Rabin, and supporter of peace with the Palestinians. As a career 
officer, Shahak had risen through the ranks, ascending to the highest position in the IDF. 
Unfortunately, his pragmatic desire to see a continuation of Rabin’s peace process 
brought him into direct contention with Netanyahu’s revisionist perspective. The unstable 
 
 
                                                 
234 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 368. “The Basic Law: Government” 
authorized the creation of such an entity, which would have amassed various additional security functions 
under the PM’s Office, offsetting the IDF’s influence in the making of security policy. In the end, however, 
DEFMIN Mordechai succeeded in downsizing the organization, which 1) wound up falling under his 
auspices and 2) had little real capacity to affect strategy or policy formulation. 
235 Ibid., 369; Peri, “Civil-military Relations in Israel in Crisis,” 117–122. Bar-Or mentions systemic 
frustration, stating, “the fact that military figures were no longer ‘in the game’ consigned them to the 
awkward position of having to provide military solutions for political contingencies that they were not 
consulted for in the first place.” Peri describes a period where the government and IDF flip-flopped roles 
related to security and policy. The latter became the voice of pragmatism, seeking to curtail Netanyahu’s 
unbridled/revisionist ideology, going so far as to utilize media “leaks” openly to shed light on what were 
perceived as dangerous courses of action. 
236 Ben-Meir, National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case, 67–71, 75, 84–85; Peri, “The 
Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy,” 25; Peri, “Civil-military Relations in Israel in Crisis,” 113–
114. “Not many months passed before he came to understand that without the military he lacked the 
knowledge, tools and ability to conduct political-security negotiations.” Ben-Meir paints this as a pattern of 
ongoing, systemic dysfunction on the part of civilian leadership, deferring to the military for all essential 
planning and staffwork. That said, it was during this period that a general IDF “role contraction” was 
underway, as noted by Peri and Cohen. 
237 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 77–90. Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–
2003,” 368–370. Issues relating to Hebron “re-deployments” and the opening of an ancient tunnel in the 
Jerusalem’s Muslim Quarter were but a few examples of policy dissention between the two entities. The 
IDF was typically kept in the dark regarding government plans until the last moment, with little opportunity 
for input or rebuttal. 
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 relationship between the two progressively worsened, with constant criticisms publicly 
traded in the media. Netanyahu eventually cast aside Shahak in favor of Shaul Mofaz, 
seen (initially) as a malleable, non-political actor.238 
While a significant portion of the Shahak-Netanyahu friction related to the latter’s 
inherent distrust of IDF, there was likely also fear of a potential, future political challenge 
should the CGS opt for a government career. This unusual nuance of the command 
relationship between the two spheres was a long recognized function of the permeability 
between the entities. As post-career movement into politics was common for senior IDF 
officers, and those with differing goals from the sitting Prime Minister/government could 
(and often would) have their credibility openly called into question.239  
By the eve of the 1999 elections, the situation between the military and 
government had deteriorated so significantly that a concerted effort was made by reserve 
and retired officers to foment/contribute to a Netanyahu loss (in favor of former CGS 
Ehud Barak). While it was certainly not uncommon for high-ranking military officials to 
join political parties upon transitioning into public life, the two traditional paths were via 
political apprenticeship and political entrepreneurship.240 In the latest case, two 
groupings (“One Israel” and “Center Party”) were created with the expressed goal of 
opposing an existing government, for the first time in Israel’s history.241 While none of 
the officers were (at the time) on active duty, and there had been no move to 
overtly/militarily displace the sitting Prime Minister; a collective desire to rid Israel of a 
perceived security threat (i.e., Netanyahu) mobilized a significant number of senior 
                                                 
238 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 370. According to Bar-Or, very few 
CGS’s managed to avoid becoming enmeshed in political matters, but Mofaz would ultimately demonstrate 
one of the most active involvements in IDF history. 
239 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 87–89. Netanyahu sought to smear the CGS by calling into 
question his political neutrality (a hallmark of the position). Ultimately, the tit-for-tat exchanges did 
eventually push Shahak into politics, where he adopted a centrist position in an effort “to continue Rabin’s 
interrupted enterprise.” 
240 Ibid., 82–83. Peri provides examples of both avenues into politics. The former, a more traditional 
route, occurred when noteworthy politicians took senior military leaders under their wing, cultivating the 
next generation within the party hierarchy. Examples of this included Moshe Dayan, Chaim Bar-Lev, and 
Yitzchak Rabni for MAPAI/LABOR, and Ezer Weizman for LIKUD. In the latter case, a few enterprising 
individual struck out on their own to form entirely new parties (i.e., Ariel Sharon, in the early 1970s). 
241 Ibid., 83. The former supported Labor’s Ehud Barak, and was comprised of numerous high-ranking 
officers. The latter was headed by former DEFMIN Yiztchak Mordechai, and recently retired CGS Shahak.  
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officers to engage in direct support of opposition parties. Although this “putsch” was 
certainly not the sole factor behind Bibi Netanyahu’s fall from power, it did emphasize 
that: 1) divergence over policy, coupled with 2) personality differences, and 3) security-
related concerns, could lead to pushback from the senior elements in the military 
sphere.242  
C. THE IDF PULLS A 180 ON PEACE (1999–2002) 
With the nearly simultaneous arrival of Ehud Barak and Shaul Mofaz on the 
scene, it was expected that relations between the government and military would improve 
significantly, coupled with a renewed drive toward lasting peace with the Palestinians.243 
With the former assuming the dual role of Prime Minister and Defense minister, the CGS 
was initially afforded wide latitude in his position as “commander of the army.”244 The 
two came to a tacit arrangement whereby Mofaz would “handle military affairs without 
interference by civilians, and the Prime Minister would manage the state without military 
opposition.”245 In theory, this plan would provide a workable compromise whereby the 
primary civil-military actors would each function simultaneously, in a de facto vacuum.  
Unfortunately, the honeymoon was short-lived, as senior IDF leadership soon 
expressed frustration with policy determinations, which ran counter to their position on 
national security. It became apparent that political pressures (both internal and external) 
were pushing the Israeli government in a particular direction, which presented grave  
 
                                                 
242 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 77–90. Peri clearly articulates that the number of senior 
officers involved exceeded 100. Notable among these were former DEFMIN Mordechai and newly retired 
CGS Shahak. These reservists and retirees not only supported opposition parties (such as LABOR), but 
specifically organized new groups and served in multiple political roles (from organizing to public 
statements and advertising) to assure Netanyahu was not re-elected.  
243 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 370. Mofaz’s assumption of command 
during a relative quiet period in relations with the Palestinians led his aspirations of being the “Peace 
CGS.” It was his hope this would allow for a renewed focus on training and improvement of the IDF. 
244 Ibid., 370. It is important to note that in the Israeli model, the term implied subordination to the 
government. This can be contrasted with a blanket “commander-in-chief of the army” designation, 
bestowed solely upon elected leadership. 
245 Ibid., 371. This presented Mofaz with the opportunity to function as de facto Defense Minister, as 
Barak’s attention tended to focus on political matters (at home and abroad). 
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concern to the military establishment. They perceived relative and actual weakening of 
the Israeli security position due to their lack of involvement in the process, running 
concurrently with an increase in asymmetric violence against the Jewish State.  
Notable among these policy discrepancies were: 1) the decision to unilaterally 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, 2) the Prime Minister’s (un)willingness 
to negotiate a full departure from the Golan Heights, and 3) the use of force to suppress 
rising levels Palestinian violence.246 Barak had publicly promised a Lebanon withdrawal 
during his 1999 election campaign, but the increasing frequency of Hezbollah attacks, 
and number of casualties, necessitated he move more rapidly than had been anticipated. 
While there was nominal support for such an undertaking among elements of the military, 
Mofaz resented: 1) the fait accompli with which he was presented, 2) the immediacy of 
the action (i.e., overnight), and 3) the potential long-term effect it would have on Israeli 
security and deterrence. Whereas Syria and the Golan were concerned, senior IDF 
leadership became angered when Barak was ultimately unwilling to abide by a tacit 
agreement to withdraw from the Golan fully in exchange for peace, based on fears of 
domestic political backlash. The military saw this as running counter to the inherent 
notion of national security, a function of a fatally fragmented and paralyzed government 
process.247 
Most importantly, the inexorable slide to violence during the late 1990s, 
punctuated by a spate of deadly suicide bombings (coupled with a fear of decreased 
Israeli deterrent capability), gradually fomented a policy swap between civilian and 
military spheres. While peace-leaning elements within IDF leadership had held sway over 
military strategy during the earlier days of optimism, a growing segment had come to 
view the deteriorating security environment as untenable. Upon the failure of the 2000 
Camp David meetings, and subsequent outbreak of the “2nd Intifada,” the Israeli military 
and government positional shift had become complete. According to Yoram Peri, “Just as 
                                                 
246 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 93–96; Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–
2003,” 371. The IDF became increasingly alarmed at what it perceived as the erosion of its posture and 
capabilities based on political concessions.  
247 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 94. The failed peace entreaty to Syria was seen by many in the 
IDF as “a victory of internal political considerations over considerations of security and the state.” 
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the beginning of the 1990s the military had shown a willingness to make far-reaching 
concessions in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, at the end of the 1990s it 
pressed for severe measures to counter the second intifada.”248 Mofaz, with broad 
support from the IDF, adopted a decisive, kinetic-force approach to insurgency 
suppression, in direct opposition to perceived policy waffling on the part of the PM and 
government.249 This established a dangerous precedent, indicating a movement afoot 
seeking the wholesale transfer of national strategy determination to the armed forces. The 
resulting, de facto abdication of policy control from civilian to military sphere gave rise 
to questions over the government’s ability to rein in an increasingly impetuous CGS.250  
By early 2001, Ehud Barak was handily defeated by the right wing, former 
General/DEFMIN Ariel Sharon. In the wake of the now defunct peace process, and rising 
Intifada-related violence, many assumed the rift between government and IDF would be 
healed with Sharon’s rise to power. In a move complicating matters, however, the new 
PM separated the DEFMIN portfolio from his own, appointing a full time keeper of the 
position (in the person of Binyamin Ben-Eliezer). Rather than contributing to a 
smoothing over of differences, the move served to exacerbate tensions with the outgoing, 
now overtly political Mofaz.251 With the Israeli government sphere accepting CGS 
security policy recommendations cart blanche, Mofaz understood the enormity of the 
                                                 
248 Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 333–334. The bases of this shift were: 1) a lack of trust in 
Arafat as a legitimate negotiating partner and 2) a desire to avoid repeating the same mistake (i.e., failure to 
act swiftly and definitively), which had hamstrung efforts during the 1st Intifada. 
249 Ibid., 334. According to Peri, the mindset adopted by the IDF was that it “intends to win in this 
confrontation, and it was unwilling to allow the political branch, with the latter’s conflicting directives…to 
diminish the military’s victory.  
250 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 103–107. With wide latitude to conduct operations, coupled 
with a limited ability/desire by Barak to exert control, Mofaz became increasingly brash in his actions. This 
ranged from verbal altercations to media “leaks” to the increasingly brutal measures used to crack down on 
Palestinians. While outright insubordination was never exhibited, it was clear that the IDF was in a position 
to apply government policies as it saw fit (i.e., according to its own interpretation). In time, Foreign 
Minister (FORMIN) Ben-Ami asserted “Barak’s breadth of control over the chief of staff is very 
problematic. Mofaz did whatever he wanted, and Barak did not put him in his place.” 
251 Ibid., 114–115. According to Peri, Ben-Eliezer was one of few Defense Ministers who neither held 
a senior command nor had the respect of IDF leadership. He found himself in the un-admirable position of 
being squeezed between a very “hands-on” Prime Minster, reknown for his military exploits, and a highly 
political CGS determined to extract as much political influence as possible.  
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influence he wielded, and began preparing for a post-military career in politics.252 
Continuing to believe that his higher goal was to the people of Israel (as a “public 
servant”), the CGS’s public outbursts and unauthorized media releases repeatedly drew 
the ire of multiple sectors within elected government.253 Unfortunately, Sharon was 
hampered in much the same way as his predecessor, forced to walk a fine line between 
U.S. pressure to engage in peace negotiations and the political/operational autonomy of 
the IDF’s leadership in fighting a LIC. 
D. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMIC (2003–
PRESENT) 
By early 2003, the cabinet situation (and by extension, the civil-military 
relationship) was altered again with the arrival of a new DEFMIN and CGS. Moshe 
Ya’alon, an outspoken critic of Arafat and the PA, assumed the mantle of CGS in June 
2002. While less politically inclined than his predecessor, the new CGS was fervent in his 
desire finally to be rid of Arafat, and equally willing to vocalize criticisms against his 
own government’s policies when necessary.254 According to Peri, “Ya’alon behaved 
according to the perception…that the CGS had not only the right, but also the authority to 
be a full partner in fashioning national security.”255  
                                                 
252 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 119–122. Peri provides a detailed perspective on the negative, 
consensus view of Shaul Mofaz as a military extension of the political branch. 
253 Bar-Or, “Political-military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003,” 372–374; Peri, Generals in the 
Cabinet Room, 114–116. Mofaz neither understood nor accepted the concept that the power of his position 
was derived purely from government appointment, not as a “public servant” (a perspective continued by his 
successors). While his ultimate responsibility was to the elected government, he took it upon himself to 
overstep boundaries at will, locking horns with anyone who crossed his path and was deemed a threat (at 
various times to include the PM, DEFMIN, FORMIN, etc.). By the end of his tenure, he was universally 
criticized (and reviled) for exercising too prominent a role in the political domain. 
254 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 137–153. The new CGS was extremely pragmatic and 
brutally honest, viewing issues strictly from a security perspective. He opposed the withdrawal from 
Lebanon, and was particularly noted for using decisive measures to subdue protests and insurrection. 
Ya’alon saw Arafat as the root cause of the most recent uprising; yet disagreed with the manner in which 
several security measures were determined. This included: 1) poor planning/implementation of the security 
“fence,” 2) the lack of diplomatic overtures to Syria, and 3) the Sharon government’s unwillingness to offer 
“carrots” in addition to “sticks.” All these bred resentment among right wing parties, ultimately tarring him 
as a friend of the Palestinians.  
255 Ibid., 138. As was the IDF norm, Ya’alon believed himself to be “the CGS of the people of Israel, 
and not just of the political echelon.” 
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January 2003’s elections further muddled the internal dynamic, when Shaul 
Mofaz (the outgoing CGS) made the abrupt “parachute” to DEFMIN.256 While the initial 
interrelationship between the triad was close early in Sharon’s second term, it gradually 
widened over time, the result of personality and professional differences. Mofaz had 
expected his new position would be akin to a “super-CGS,” with de facto control over the 
IDF in line with his recent authority level. It was not until his civilian transition that the 
DEFMIN’s lack of influence became glaringly apparent to him, as both PM and CGS 
jealously guarded their own particular fiefdoms.  
The widening policy rift between Sharon and Ya’alon reached the point (in early 
2005) where the latter’s term was not extended (essentially “fired”), in favor of a 
candidate who was both politically connected to the Prime minister and loyal enough 
accomplish his policy bidding.257 Sharon, thereby, circumvented a politically weak 
Mofaz, bypassing several more senior officers, and in Dan Halutz, an acceptable nominee 
was found. The new CGS was willing to implement the Prime Minister’s policy for 
withdrawal from Gaza, and undertook a much needed streamlining of the IDF. Upon an 
unexpected national leadership change in early 2006 (a function of Sharon’s medical 
incapacitation), however, Halutz was presented with a new administration (PM and 
DEFMIN) sorely lacking in both policy and military experience.258 Following the failed 




                                                 
256 Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room,” 132–134. PM Sharon chose the hard-line Mofaz as a means 
of withstanding an internal LIKUD party challenge from Netanyahu. Mofaz’s quick shift from military to 
political life (less than what was considered the normal/appropriate “cooling off” period) only reinforced 
what many had long surmised about his true goal.  
257 Anshel Pfeffer, “A Hierarchy Gone Awry,” The Jerusalem Post, January 18, 2007, 3 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1167467757401&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull 
(accessed May 25, 2009). This demonstrated 1) a weakness in the appointment process, whereby politics 
typically drove the selection of senior military postings, and 2) an inherent connection between the two 
spheres.  
258 Ibid.; Harry de Quetteville “A Most Uncompromising General,” The Daily Telegraph (London) 
July 26, 2006, sec. News; Middle East Conflict, 12 .Neither Ehud Olmert (as PM) nor Amir Pertez (as 
DEFMIN) had appreciable military experience and, as policy and strategy neophytes, Halutz was left with 
no clear sense of direction from the government sphere.  
 85
CGS. Halutz was faulted not only for poor planning and strategy on the part of the IDF, 
but also not taking a more proactive role in warning the political leadership of potential 
shortcomings with military training and readiness.259  
Within months, both DEFMIN Peretz and CGS Mofaz resigned their positions, 
with highly regarded replacements found in former PM Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi, 
respectively. While the first two years for both men has been dedicated to restoring the 
IDF’s deterrent capability, it has also been marked alternatively by successful combat 
operations (the CAST LEAD Gaza incursion) and continued political wrangling over 
senior IDF appointments (the latter demonstrating continued challenges in the delineation 
of roles and responsibilities).260  
                                                 
259 Yaakov Katz, “Halutz Acted 'Impulsively' Misled Cabinet. Committee: Other Generals should 
have alerted Ministers about Deficiencies in Training and Readiness,” The Jerusalem Post, May 1, 2007, 2; 
Pfeffer, “A Hierarchy Gone Awry,” 3; de Quetteville, “A Most Uncompromising General,” 12. Ever 
impulsive, and ill-concerned with the ramifications of operationally incurred collateral damage (i.e., 
casualties and physical destruction), Halutz was faulted for using excessive/indiscriminate force and 
insufficient planning during the 2006 Lebanon campaign. Rather than presenting civilian leadership with a 
range of possible courses of action, the Israeli system provided for a “final version” for consideration only. 
This proved disastrous when the combination of 1) a poorly formulated, risk/casualty-averse government 
strategy was coupled with, 2) the CGS’s emphasis on technologically-based, stand-off warfare. 
Cumulatively, these proved wholly ineffective in combating Hezbollah’s asymmetric threat, ultimately 
perpetuating deterioration in IDF deterrence.  
260 Amos Harel, “Barak-Ashkenazi Clash Postpones IDF Appointments,” May 22, 2009, Ha'aretz 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
As the first decade of the 21st century approaches its conclusion, fully 
understanding Israeli civil-military relations remains vital in efforts to attain 
comprehensive peace in a region plagued by decades of inter and intra state violence. 
While there has been a propensity to examine Israel’s regional status and policy 
formulation/implementation solely in terms of external factors, in reality, it is the 
interaction of three domestic components (politics, population and economics), which 
exert the preponderance of influence on the relationship between civilian and military 
spheres. Each are influenced by regional and global factors, which further impacts the 
inter-sphere dynamic, gradually altering it over time. 
Rather than succumbing to the debilitating effects of intractable conflict, the 
Jewish state continues to thrive in the face of adversity, resisting devolution into 
Lasswell’s predicted “garrison state” model. This has been a function of not only a 
democratic process, but also the hybrid interaction between civilian and military 
domains, where inherently blurred and fragmented boundaries enable rapid response to 
strategic and operational threats. There are those who consider such connections as, 1) 
broadly inefficient and 2) antithetical to traditional civil-military relations, where the 
presence of functional democracy is indicated by integral boundaries. That said, 
newer/constructionist theories seek to explain this unique dynamic through the study of 
societal-specific variables (to include history, culture, geography, etc.), opining that there 
is no single right answer to the needs of a particular state. Only when external actors are 
able to rationalize, come to terms with, and harness the micro-level conduct of Israel’s 
decision making process will improved regional coordination become possible.  
The purpose of this conclusion is to reiterate key findings articulated within the 
study, clearly establishing their relevance in the case of Israeli civil-military relations. 
The principle takeaway is that historical, cultural and economic factors do play a 
paramount role in country-specific development and that generalizations based on 
traditional theories are, 1) not always wholly appropriate and 2) require revisiting and 
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reassessment over time. As additionally noted, by examining long-term data it does 
appear that specific trends can be extrapolated. First, Israel remains a pluralistic 
democracy challenged by ongoing conflict. Second. Israel’s development was explicitly 
influenced by its security dilemma. Third, Israel continues to rely on a uniquely hybrid 
arrangement whereby civil and military spheres function as a de facto partnership. 
Finally, continued Westernization and Globalization will directly impact the character of 
its security establishment (to include its larger role within society).  
It should be noted that there are strong theoretical opinions on both sides of the 
aisle among scholars, with no inherently “right” answer to the Israeli case. Each attempts 
to reconcile the unique nature of Israel’s civil-military relationship as defined by security 
considerations. Perspectives are often colored by the timeframe in which study was 
undertaken, or by the inherent bias of a particular model. Most effectively, Moshe Lissak 
summarizes the general dilemma in his five paradoxes. 
• First: While the IDF maintains a position of centrality in Israel, it is not 
the most important factor. 
• Second: While the military is actively involved in security related policy 
making, Israel remains a thriving democracy. 
• Third: While there is a certain amount of political involvement in senior 
IDF appointments, by and large, promotion is based on leadership and 
performance. 
• Fourth: While the military is certainly a key interest group, it remains but 
one among several. 
• Fifth: Despite fragmentation and permeability between the civil and 
military spheres, the latter has inherently remained subordinate to the 
former.261 
These provide an adequate summation of the dichotomy regularly experienced by those 
studying or interacting with Israel at an official level. 
In so far as the definitions initially articulated are concerned, the following can be 
demonstrated. 
                                                 
261 Moshe Lissak, “Paradoxes of Israeli Civil-military Relations: An Introduction,” in Israeli Society 
and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, ed. Moshe 
Lissak (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1984), 1–8. 
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• The military: The IDF is a highly organized, efficient, and respected 
entity. While the organization remains officially subordinate to the civilian 
government, it continues to demonstrate an unusual level of influence over 
the process of policy formulation and implementation.262 This is largely a 
function of its emergence as an epistemic authority on issues relating to 
defense and security, whereby it has assumed the role as recognized expert 
relative to civilian government. 
• Professionalism: Despite initial reliance on a nation-in-arms construct, 
the Israeli armed forces have gradually transitioned to a more professional 
model over the past 20 years. This is a function of declining threats and 
budgets, which necessitated a role contraction from involvement in 
civilian-related matters (i.e., education, medical care, and infrastructure 
projects, etc.).  
• Militarism: There are clearly dissenting opinions on the issue whereas 
Israel is concerned. Uri Ben-Eliezer, Yoram Peri and Giora Goldberg 
indicate that Israel fits the criteria to be considered militaristic. According 
to the former, military considerations take precedence over civil matters, 
and have since the state’s inception.263 Additionally, the unique 
connection between the IDF and society feeds into the nation-in-arms 
concept, which is “used by the political and military elites to provide 
justification for political problems and to mobilize the entire population 
for war.”264 Goldberg agrees that militarism encroaches into Israel’s 
political system, but that it is not inherently fatal to the state’s democratic 
legacy.265 Conversely, Moshe Lissak, Stuart Cohen, and Sucharov all 
challenge the notion that Israel is a militaristic society. Lissak maintains 
that such a characterization requires the state to have an 
offensive/expansionist culture, and that the military needs be the central 
                                                 
262 Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil--Military Relations,” 520. “The 
Israeli case demonstrates the unique situation where the military, deeply involved in the political process, 
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263 Yoram Peri, “The Political-military Complex,” 328. Peri concurs, stating, “the Israeli case…was 
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264 Lissak, “The Unique Approach to Military-societal Relations in Israel,” 245. Ben Eliezer compares 
the Israeli model to that of Imperial Japan, Prussia and Czarist Russia. 
265 Goldberg, “The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System,” 28–29. It is her belief that, 
while former military officers fill a disproportionate share of political positions, their fragmented opinions 
and ideologies inhibit the development of a cohesive challenger to the legitimate/elected government. 
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focus and guiding element of society.266 He further indicates that, 1) 
militarism in certain aspects of society should not imply the entire model 
is militaristic and 2) the pluralistic nature of the Israeli system mitigates 
any potential for such an extreme position.267 
• Boundaries/Separation/Permeability: The Israeli civil-military 
relationship has developed out of a fragmented boundary model, where 
convergence between the two domains has become the norm (vice the 
exception). Unlike Western arrangements, there is a lack of integral 
boundaries, whereby exchange can occur in both directions.268 According 
to Lissak, this “prevented the military from becoming a separate caste 
which feels itself alienated from, and in conflict with, the values 
represented by the civilian elites.”269  
• Linkages: Related to the issue of fragmented boundaries, linkages and 
points of contact between civil and military spheres remain broadly based 
and patently intact. According to Etzioni-Halevy, insubordination is rare, 
but the following five results are demonstrated: 1) military 
advocacy/challenge of government policy though media channels, 2) IDF 
involvement in policy formation via participation in cabinet meetings and 
negotiations with foreign actors, 3) party/political appointments 
(recruiting) of senior military officers based on similar policy 
perspectives, whereby government policy is self-perpetuating, 4) the 
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mobility channel for IDF leadership, and 5) close social relations between 
the domains due to common experiences and the small size of Israeli 
society.270 
• Nation-in-arms: Israel’s founding fathers instituted a universal 
conscription model to: 1) maximize available resources, 2) mitigate 
detrimental impacts on the economy, and 3) incorporate the military as a 
social bonding agent. Based on a tier model, relying on professionals, 
conscripts and reservists, this role expansion was very indicative of 
Israel’s formative years. It was effective in creating both strong military 
and viable state, propelling Israel into regional hegemony. In recent years, 
decreased military threats, budget constraints and changes in attitude have 
facilitated a role contraction.271 While it is unlikely that the IDF will ever 
be completely divorced from its reliance on conscription, the move toward 
increasing professionalization poses potential ramifications for civil-
military relations, as the latter has the potential for turning inward as a 
solitary actor.  
As the Cold War came to a close in the early 1990s, Israel experienced a decrease 
in direct military threat, offset by the rise of asymmetric and long-range challenges. The 
latter inherently implied/required a more nuanced political approach, as the direct 
application of conventional force had not only proven less than effective, but also further 
widened the gulf between civilian and security domains. While IDF leaders have seen the 
continued waning of their budgets as a percentage of GDP, this belies the fact that 
spending (in real terms) has continued to accelerate (a function of economic growth). 
Additionally, the time period from Israel’s founding through the early 1990s was marked 
de facto military influence over broadly defined security matters, with the civilian 
government lacking the infrastructure in which to counterbalance the armed forces 
effectively. Unlike the early years, when personal will, custom and tradition were enough 
to subordinate the IDF, Israel’s increasingly professionalized military and fragmented  
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political system have contributed to a unique civil-military environment. The cumulative 
effect of military, political, cultural and economic factors unleashed as early as 1967 
continued to resonate even today.  
While it is unclear what the future holds in store for the stability of this Israel’s 
civil-military dynamic, recent history would appear to indicate the system remains 
functional (if imperfect). The Israeli model manifests a recurring struggle for political 
power and control, and is marked by “the army’s growing influence over government 
decision making in security matters, and the government’s attempt to narrow the senior 
command’s influence on its decisions.”272 This adhoc/hybrid arrangement continues to 
demonstrate civilian reliance on military input and expertise to formulate security 
strategy and policy. According to Yoram Peri, since at least the early 1990s “a picture 
emerged of an IDF with its own clear vision for the middle East, a view that the IDF 
encouraged successive Israeli governments to adopt.”273 That said, while personality 
differences and political posturing have often affected the nature of the civil-military 
relationship (typically a function of issues relating to peace and security), there has never 
been an overt or expressed desire by IDF leadership to subsume control from their elected 
government. Rather, de jure superiority continues to remain in civilian hands and will 
likely remain so for the foreseeable future.  
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